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Abstract 
This PhD thesis assesses the direct and indirect effects of two economic 
policies. The first one, analyzed in Chapter One, is the family-friendly 
law (Act 39/99) approved in Spain in 1999 which grants parents the 
right to reduce working time for childcare issues.  We find an increase in 
work-time reduction by around 18%. In addition, we find that employers 
restrict indefinite contracts to potential users of the law so as to limit its 
use. Furthermore, we find that in the recent economic downturn the use 
of the law decreased by around 13% compared to the preceding upturn 
period. Chapters Two and Three assess the impact of a second 
economic policy: The Minimum Income Scheme (MIS), which has been 
operating in the Basque Country (one of Spain’s 17 regions) for more 
than twenty years. In particular, Chapter Two assesses its impact, 
effectiveness, and efficiency in fighting poverty. Results show that MIS 
has had a strong impact in reducing all dimensions of poverty. However, 
only 59.2% of the benefit transferred effectively contributes to poverty 
reduction. The paper presents an alternative, more egalitarian design of 
the Minimum Income Scheme which, in line with an international 
standard of poverty, seeks to maximize its coverage and its impact in 
reducing poverty. Finally, Chapter Three assesses whether the policy 
delays entry into employment for recipients. In addition, we test the 
efficacy of active policies aimed at enabling recipients of the MIS to re-
enter employment. Our results indicate that on average the Minimum 
Income Scheme, in addition to preventing social exclusion by providing 
financial support, does not delay entry into employment. However, the 
impact differs from one demographic group to another. Furthermore, 
Active Labor Market Policies designed for recipients of this benefit, in 
particular training, have a strong positive impact on finding a new job. 
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Public policies are crucial to solving social problems, reducing 
inequalities, and tackling unfairness. Through the creation and 
application of social and economic policies, policy makers thus have a 
huge influence on society. However, those policies might sometimes 
either not achieve their objectives or achieve them inefficiently. 
Furthermore, policies may also produce indirect or unexpected effects.  
To understand the consequences of public policies, it is essential to 
analyze their impact on society. Policy evaluation studies the direct and 
indirect effects of laws. This enables better decisions to be taken and 
better use to be made of public resources. 
This essay is a contribution to that issue. My doctoral dissertation 
assesses two public policies. The first is a family-friendly policy, and 
Chapter 1 centers on evaluating its direct and indirect effects on the 
labor market. The second is a Minimum Income Scheme that operates in 
the Basque Country. Chapter 2 measures its effectiveness and efficiency 
in reducing poverty and Chapter 3 focuses on its indirect effects on the 
labor market. As shown below, this study covers several economic fields 
including the labor market, gender equality, and poverty, which are 
some of the most important topics currently under debate. All the 
evaluations in this thesis are conducted by applying advanced statistical 
and econometric techniques to various micro databases.  
Specifically, Chapter 1 assesses a policy aimed at promoting gender 
equality and equity in the workplace which was implemented in Spain in 
1999. Family issues play a crucial role in understanding the gender 
differences observed in the labor market. In spite of the huge progress 
that women have made, gender differences still persist. Governments 
and institutions can play an important role in creating the legal 
framework for improving women’s choices and their participation in the 
economy, as well as in helping societies to break away from the more 
traditional gender role attitudes that affect women’s behavior in many 
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countries. Indeed, in the past few decades many governments have 
adopted policies in this direction. The first policy under analysis here, 
called Law 39/99, was particularly aimed at giving parents with children 
under 6 years of age the right to reduce their working time with an 
equivalent wage reduction. The spirit of this law is to make it more 
affordable for parents to stay in the labor market and take care of their 
children by reducing their working time. The first analysis measures 
whether it has been successful in this. Furthermore, workers who avail 
themselves of this policy enjoy more protection against dismissals than 
the rest. This undoubtedly entails certain undesirable effects that the 
policy makers did not expect. Those effects are also addressed in 
Chapter 1. Some of the assessments are conducted by applying a 
differences-in-differences strategy using the Spanish Current 
Population Survey (SCPS), the most representative cross sectional sample 
of the labor force in Spain. The last analysis in this chapter conducts a 
within-cell estimation and makes use of the Continuous Sample of Work 
Histories, a dataset obtained from the Spanish Social Security system.  
The second law assessed is a last resort scheme whose main objective is 
to guarantee individuals their basic right to a decent minimum standard 
of living. Specifically, I assess the Minimum Income Scheme (MIS) that 
has been place in the Basque Country continuously since 1989. The 
Great Recession has had severe consequences in terms of poverty, as it 
has placed many citizens at risk of social exclusion. As a result, such 
schemes are currently at the heart of public debate. The most widely 
used are the so-called "simple and comprehensive schemes", which 
basically cover every person/household in need of support, without 
confining their effects to particular categories of people. Since 2008, the 
European Council has endorsed the objective of combining adequate 
income support with labor market activation measures so as to facilitate 
re-entry of recipients into employment. In this line, Chapters 2 and 3 
assess the impact of the Basque simple and comprehensive scheme 
called Renta de Garantía de Ingresos.  
14 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on whether MIS achieves its goal of ensuring a decent 
minimum standard of living for Basque citizens and the extent to which 
MIS is effective and efficient in its goal of reducing poverty. The 
different dimensions of poverty are explored using the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) family indexes. Beckerman (1979) provides a model 
used in measuring the effectiveness and efficiency indicators.  
Chapter 3 first tests whether the Basque MIS delays entry into the labor 
market for its recipients, as empirical evidence has proven that passive 
policies tend to do. Finally, the efficacy of policies aimed at enabling 
recipients to re-enter employment is also assessed in Chapter 3. This is 
done using monthly longitudinal information on all individuals who were 
registered with the Basque Public Employment Service from February 
2015 to January 2016. Propensity Score methods enable the causal 
effect of the policy to be measured, dealing with the confounding 
effects and different composition between treated and control groups. 
Chapter 4 then summarizes the main results obtained in this 
dissertation, presents possible further research and ends with some 
policy recommendations. The document finalizes with an annex and the 
list of references.  
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1.1. Introduction   
Women have made huge progress in the workplace, especially in the 
more industrialized countries. Goldin (2004) refers to the mass 
incorporation of women into the workforce during the seventies as the 
“quiet revolution”. However, in spite of this revolutionary process, 
gender differences still persist.  
Family issues play a crucial role in understanding the gender differences 
observed in the labor market. Women combine employment with home 
responsibilities to a much larger extent than their male partners. This is 
particularly so in some countries, such as those of Southern Europe, 
because of the lack of access to proper childcare provisions (Del Boca 
2002), low levels of participation by men in household tasks (Bettio and 
Villa 1998; De Laat and Sevilla-Sanz 2011) and/or low levels of social 
assistance (Adserà 2004). This gender asymmetry in reconciling family 
life and work affects women’s decisions with respect to labor supply, 
human capital accumulation, and hence their labor-market performance 
(see Ahn and Mira 2001; Bertola, Blau, and Kahn 2007; Adserà 2005; De 
la Rica and Iza 2005, among others).  
The increase in the working-age population and the high education level 
achieved by women in the past few decades make it essential to 
consider women as a fundamental part of the workforce. Governments 
and institutions can play an important role in creating the legal 
framework for improving women’s choices and their participation in the 
economy, as well as in helping societies to break away from the more 
traditional gender role attitudes that affect women’s behavior in many 
countries. Indeed, in the past few decades many governments have 
adopted policies aimed at promoting gender equality and equity in the 
workplace. This paper seeks to evaluate one such policy implemented in 
Spain in 1999.  
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The policy under analysis, called Law 39/99, was particularly aimed at 
giving parents with children under 6 years of age the right to reduce 
their work schedule with an equivalent wage reduction. The spirit of this 
law is to make it more affordable for parents to stay in the labor market 
and take care of their children by reducing their work schedules. 
Furthermore, as explained below, workers who avail themselves of this 
policy enjoy more protection against dismissals than the rest. This may 
undoubtedly entail some undesirable effects that the policy makers did 
not expect. Those effects are also addressed in the paper.  
The aim of the paper is twofold: First, we evaluate the immediate impact 
of the law, in particular its direct and indirect effects. By direct effects 
we mean the extent to which the law has led to an increase in part-time 
working among parents with children aged under 6. With respect to the 
indirect effects, we explore whether employers behave strategically 
towards potential users of the law in the following sense: If the family 
policy is costly for firms and in addition its users are more protected 
against dismissals than other workers some reaction from employers 
might be expected. In particular, they might tend to reduce the 
indefinite hiring of potential users of the law and instead offer fixed-
term contracts – whose potential costs are much smaller. Hence, the 
question to be answered with regards to this indirect effect is whether 
the law increased the probability of being hired under a fixed-term  
(rather than an indefinite) contract for potential future law users. To 
answer these two questions, we focus on salaried employees using the 
Spanish Current Population Survey (SCPS), the most representative cross 
sectional sample of the labor force in Spain. We use individual 
information on working hours and compare the use of reduced hours 
among workers affected by the law (treatment group) with those not 
affected by it (comparison group) just before and after the passing of 
the law (diff-in-diff strategy).  
18 
 
The second aim of the study is to characterize the users who have 
resorted to the family friendly policy since its approval (1999) and 
measure the extent to which the Great Recession has led to a change in 
the number of policy users and in their personal and job profiles. In 
principle, it might be expected that in a recession framework 
uncertainty about the possibility of being laid off might lead to an 
increase in the use of work time reduction as a measure for providing 
higher job protection against dismissal. But work time reduction entails 
a proportional reduction in wages, and this negative effect on income is 
likely to be more important in a recession context. In addition, fear of 
reprisals at work during a period of economic instability for the firm 
might also discourage workers from requesting work reductions for 
childcare issues. To detect individuals who make use of the law, i.e., 
who change their time schedule for childcare issues, we need to follow 
workers over time. We use a rich longitudinal data set obtained from 
Spanish Social Security records (Continuous Sample of Work Histories 
(CSWH)) that covers workers’ employment histories and census 
registration data including family characteristics. The dataset contains 
information on personal and job characteristics before and after workers 
have children and thus detects actual users of the law and their profiles.  
Our results indicate, in the first place, that the law increased the 
likelihood of working part-time for eligible mothers – i.e. mothers with 
children under 6 – by 18% compared to the similar non-target 
comparison group. Furthermore, the law applied only to mothers with 
indefinite contracts. In addition, we find negative indirect effects for 
potential users of the law: When comparing hiring practices as regards 
potential users of the law (target group), i.e. non-mothers of 
childbearing age, with a similar non-target comparison group (non-
fathers of fertile age) we find that the law increased the probability of 
the target group being hired under fixed-term contracts by almost 18%. 
Third, the 2008-2013 recession reduced the probability of the law being 
resorted to by about 13%.  
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The related literature on the evaluation of the Family-Friendly Law 
33/99 is scarce. Fernández-Kranz and Rodriguez-Planas (2014) is 
closer to the first part of our study, although they use the 2010 
Continuous Sample of Working Histories to evaluate the wage and 
employment effects of such law. As we describe below in the data 
section, we consider this dataset inappropriate to evaluate the impact of 
a law which took place in 1999, as administrative data of 2010 is not 
representative of Social Security records of more than 10 years before. 
They find that the law implied the substitution of fertile-age women 
away from good jobs and a decrease of their relative wages. In a 
different but related study, Fernández-Kranz and Rodriguez-Planas 
(2011) examine the implications of reducing time-schedule for women's 
subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of 
contract. Using the Continuous Sample of Work Histories and focusing 
on prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, 
they find that the PT/FT hourly wage differential is larger and more 
persistent among fixed-term contract female workers. However, this 
study does not explicitly address the use of Part-Time for childcare 
issues and hence, it is not related to the use of the Law.    
Regarding related literature on the impact of the Great Recession on 
family-friendly policies, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first one to address the use of reduced-work schedule for childcare 
issues, although the crisis and subsequent austerity policies have 
reawakened debate on the gender impact of the economic cycle (see 
Rake, 2009; Swaffield, 2011). Rubbery and Rafferty (2013) explore the 
trends in women’s employment position during the recession, providing 
the support that gender segregation across sectors is the prime factor 
shaping outcomes. The recession and its aftermaths are having 
differential but still damaging effects on different groups of women. 
Other studies, such as Aparicio and González (2014), focus on the 
impact of the crisis on the health of newborn babies. They find evidence 
that mothers-to-be engage in healthier behaviors when unemployment 
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is high, which might explain the observed improvement in their babies´ 
health during the recession. In addition, De la Rica and Rebollo (2015) 
analyze the different transitions from and to unemployment during 
different phases of the business cycle in the segmented Spanish labor 
market, using the Continuous Sample of Working Histories. The find 
very significant gender differences in these transitions because males 
are found to respond more intensively to the business cycle than 
women.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Spanish Law 
39/1999. Section 3 presents the databases (SCPS and CSWH). Section 4 
analyzes the effects of the family-friendly policy on employment 
outcomes for the eligible population and the unintended effects of the 
law after its implementation on the non-eligible population of the 
policy. Section 5 presents profiles of users and outlines the impact of 
the 2008 in Spain on the use of the law. Section 6 sums up and 
concludes. 
1.2. Family friendly policy (Law 39/99) – 
Reduced work schedule for childcare 
On November 6th 1999 the Spanish government passed a law which 
granted working parents with children under 6 years old the right to 
reduce their work schedules to reconcile work and family life. The work 
time reduction granted ranges from one third to one half of the usual 
full-time schedule, with an equivalent wage reduction. Workers also 
have the right to choose the time slot during the day when they want to 
work. The firm must either agree or go to court. Under this law worker 
dismissals for any reason related to pregnancy, maternity or paternity 
leave, and child-care were declared “unfair”. When employers face 
“unfair” dismissals for reasons other than pregnancy, maternity or 
childcare they can solve them by either paying the severance payments 
stipulated for unfair dismissals (45 days per year worked at the time of 
the passing of the law) or by re-hiring the worker. In practically all cases 
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firms pay the severance payment and do not re-hire the worker. 
However, if dismissals related with pregnancy, maternity or childcare 
issues are declared unfair workers must be readmitted. The possibility 
of payment for unfair dismissals is not envisaged in this case, so in 
essence this law provides its users with greater protection against 
dismissals.   
There are several issues to be pointed out: First, the fact that users of 
the law enjoy de facto higher protection against dismissals has raised 
some debate about the potential inflexibility regarding any future 
dismissals that firms face when hiring potential law users. Second, this 
protection against dismissal essentially applies only to workers under 
indefinite contracts. The law says nothing with respect to any obligation 
to renew fixed-term contracts. In principle, target workers with fixed-
term contracts are also granted the right to use the policy and hence 
reduce their working hours. However, given that the situation with 
regard to job protection differs so much from one type of contract to 
another, we look at the potential impacts of the law for each type of 
contract separately here. Finally, as mentioned above, the policy was 
aimed at helping to reconcile work and family life for families with 
children under 6. However, we focus only on the potential impact on 
mothers, given that preliminary evidence indicates that the proportion 
of fathers who resorted to part-time work both before and after the 
passing of the law is consistently lower than 1%.   
1.3. The Data  
As mentioned in the introduction, we use two main databases to (i) 
measure the immediate direct and indirect effects of the policy; and (ii) 
characterize law users after the law is implemented and measure the 
extent to which their numbers have increased or decreased during the 
recession years. For the first purpose we use the Spanish Current 
Population Survey (SCPS) (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA), and for the 
second we use the Continuous Sample of Work Histories (CSWH) dataset 
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from Social Security records (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, 
MCVL), which has been collected on an annual basis since 2005.  
Spanish	Current	Population	Survey	(SCPS)		
SCPS is a cross-sectional database which provides the most 
representative information on the Spanish population. It contains 
demographic characteristics (age, gender, years of education, marital 
status, region of work and residence, etc.), employment characteristics 
(current status, type of contract, last work, tenure, duration of current 
contract if fixed-term, number of hours worked in the current job, 
current PT status, weekly hours of work, labor status last year, etc.), 
fertility information (such as number of children, demographic 
characteristics of children, etc.) and household information (number of 
adults and children in the household, information about grandparents, 
etc.). We use information for the second quarter of each year from two 
years before the law was implemented to two years after. Specifically, we 
denote as “before” the years 1998 and 1999 and as “after” the years 
2001 and 2002. We disregard the year 2000 as we consider it as a 
reference period to guarantee a clear cut before and after.  
To check for robustness we run the following sensitivity checks: (i) 
estimate the impact of the law using a placebo sample which includes 
1996 and 1997; (ii) use only mothers with children born before the 
passing of the law as the treatment group in the “after” period, in order 
to avoid any potential endogeneity of law users; (iii) use the years 2003 
and 2004 instead of 2001 and 2002 as the “after” group. This allows us 
to check, first, whether the results found before might be overestimated 
as a consequence of an anticipated effect of women who waited until 
just after the law was passed to have a child so as to use the family 
friendly policy. Second, by using 2003 and 2004 as the “after” period we 
check the extent to which the impact is sustained over time.  
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Continuous	sample	of	work	histories	(CSWH)	
This dataset is compiled annually from 2005 to 2013. It consists of 4% 
of the population registered with the Social Security (SS) system either as 
workers, unemployed receiving benefits or pensioners for at least one 
day of the current year of the sample (over a million work histories). The 
complete labor market history is reported for all individuals. This 
database provides highly detailed information about their past and 
present labor activities, including monthly wages, type of contract, 
receipt of unemployment insurance benefits, reasons for job 
termination, and several characteristics of hiring firms such as size, age, 
ownership, location, and sector of activity. Individual characteristics 
such as age, gender, residence, nationality and household 
characteristics such as gender and date of birth of household members 
are also provided in the database – they are obtained from census 
records. Every individual in the sample is followed if they maintain any 
relationship (working, being unemployed receiving benefits or as 
pensioners) with Social Security records. There are several 
characteristics that make the CSWH an appropriate database for this 
aim. Firstly, it is an administrative dataset that provides highly accurate 
information on employment for a random sample of 4% of all Social 
Security records. The data can be combined with census information on 
each year so that it is possible to obtain information about family 
members. Secondly, it is longitudinal so it is possible to obtain 
information on the worker's entire labor market history. Furthermore it 
assigns an employer identification code that enables firms, sectors, 
numbers of workers and locations to be identified. Type of contract, 
entry and leaving date, and hours worked are also known. We pool all 
the information registered in CSWH from 2005 to 2013. Hence, any 
individual who is included in this dataset for at least one day from 2005 
to 2013 appears in our sample. The fact that this dataset is compiled 
only from 2005 onwards disregards it to evaluate the immediate impact 
of the law, which is the aim of the first part of the paper. The sample of 
parents that can be observed reducing working hours due to childcare 
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issues in the years previous to the passing of the law is very small and 
not representative, given that workers are restricted to have any contact 
with Social Security in 2005.   
We use quarterly data from 2000 to 2011, keeping the information on 
all variables from the CSWH on the last day of the chosen months 
(January, April, July and October), i.e. we create a new panel of data with 
48 observations per individual. We focus only on salaried workers (as 
they are the only ones affected by the law). As CSWH provides 
information on the complete working life, if there is no information on 
any date we consider the individual in question as unemployed without 
receiving benefits or inactive. For our study we only keep work episodes. 
Furthermore, we can capture the existence (and age) of children, if any, 
as we have the birth-rates of all household members. Given all the 
information available, this dataset is highly suitable for recognizing 
users of the law and analyzing the impact of the crisis on the use of the 
policy.  
1.4. The impact of the law – Direct and indirect 
effects  
1.4.1. Direct effect  
The main question to be answered here is whether the implementation 
of the law resulted in an increase in the use of reduced working hours 
(part-time work) by parents with children under 6, as its spirit intended. 
As mentioned above, we investigate this using the Spanish Current 
Population Survey for the two years prior to the passing of the law and 
the two years following it. We first describe the specific sample used to 
address this question:  
First, we focus on salaried employees with indefinite contracts. In 
principle the right to ask for work time reduction also applies to fixed-
term contract workers who are parents of children under 6 years of age. 
However, evidence from the CSWH reveals that there are almost no 
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female workers under fixed-term contracts who have children fulfilling 
the conditions for them to be potential users of the law. Hence we 
restrict our study to workers with indefinite contracts. We also restrict it 
to individuals aged between 25 and 45, i.e. of fertile age. Over 45s with 
very small children or with no children may be outliers in terms of their 
behavior in the labor market (they account for 11% of the whole sample). 
We drop workers younger than 25 because some of them might be 
students or live with their parents, which would change their profiles: we 
want to avoid parents who are students in the analysis (2.5% of the 
sample of parents). In addition we focus on married people, as single 
mothers might face different personal circumstances from the rest in 
resorting to the law.  
Preliminary evidence indicates that the proportion of fathers who use 
part-time work is consistently lower than 1%, both before and after the 
introduction of the law, we focus on the impact of the law on mothers. 
Hence, our reference (treatment) group is mothers working under 
indefinite contracts who have children under 6 years old.  
As a comparison (control) group we select women without children, i.e. 
people under very similar conditions (with indefinite contracts, married 
and of fertile age) but not affected by the law. The discussion of what 
group is the most appropriate for comparison purposes is not trivial. In 
principle, another potential control group might be mothers with 
children who also need childcare (for example between 6 and 8 years 
old) but are not affected by the law . To justify our choice of a 
comparison group, we compare the use of part-time work by the three 
potential groups – the target group and the two potential control 
groups, before and after the passing of the law. Figure 1.1 depicts that 
trend:  
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Figure 1.1. Part-time rate. SCPS (1992-2004) 
Married women between 25 and 45 years old under indefinite contract 
 
 The red line depicts the proportion of part-time (PT) workers for 
our target group of mothers with children between 0 and 5 years old.  A 
steady increase in PT can be observed, which becomes clearly more 
pronounced from 2000 onwards. The green line represents PT for 
mothers with children between 6 and 8 years old and the blue line 
shows PT for women with no children  . It is immediately apparent that 
the proportion of PT workers who are mothers with children between 6 
and 8 shows a significant increase around the years when the law was 
passed which is not mirrored in the other two groups. This means that 
the parallel trends assumption is not satisfied. This different behavior 
does not disappear when we control for other observable covariates 
such as education, age, and type of job. Indeed the target or treatment 
group seems to follow a similar trend to that of women without children: 
the proportions of PT workers run parallel before the implementation of 
the law, with a consistent gap of approximately 4 percentage points. 
This gap remains the same when observable individual and job 
characteristics are controlled for, but it is consistent in the years prior to 
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the passing of the law. This is the main reason why we choose women 
with no children as the control group.  
Our final sample covers 9520 female workers aged between 25 and 45, 
all of whom are married and hold indefinite contracts. 6329 of them 
have children under 6 years old (treatment group) and 3191 have no 
children (control group).  
Methodology	
To conduct this analysis we use the Spanish Current Population Survey. 
The main disadvantage of cross-sectional data is the lack of longitudinal 
information on individuals. To address this drawback we use a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) method. The DiD design is usually based 
on comparing two de facto different groups before and after the 
occurrence of the treatment, i.e. a total of four groups. Three of these 
groups are not affected by the treatment. Time is an important variable 
in distinguishing between the groups. Besides the group which has 
already received the treatment (mothers after the passing of the law in 
our analysis) these groups are the following: (i) those treated prior to 
the current treatment (mothers before the implementation of the policy); 
(ii) those not treated, i.e. the control group, just before the treatment is 
applied to those treated (non-mothers before 2000); and (iii) those not 
treated after the treatment  (non-mothers after 2000). The idea of this 
empirical strategy is that if the two treated groups and the two control 
groups are subject to the same time trends, and if the treatment has no 
effect before the passing of the policy, then an estimate of the 'effect' of 
the treatment in a period in which it is known to have none can be used 
to remove the effect of interference factors to which a comparison of 
post-treatment outcomes of treated and non-treated subjects may be 
prone.  
This empirical strategy consists of estimating the following probability 
equation for the likelihood of working part-time.  
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𝑃𝑇#$ = 	𝛼 + 𝛽 · 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 	𝛾 · 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛿 · 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 +	𝑋5#$𝜋 + ɛ#$							[1.1] 
where t indexes the year and i the individual; and where  𝐷#  = 1 if 
individual i receives the treatment (mothers with children under 6) and 
zero otherwise (women without children); 𝐷$ = 1 if observation is after 
the treatment (2001, 20021) and zero if the observation is before the 
treatment (1998 and 1999) 2 . 𝑋#$  is a vector of covariates where we 
include demographic, employment and family information as: age, level 
of education, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the family-
head, birth, unemployment, temporary and partiality rate by region of 
work and year and sector of work. Finally, ɛ#$  is a zero mean 
disturbance.  
The intercept β is the non-treatment effect. That is the gap we observe 
before policy implementation, i.e. those non-observable variables that 
affect differently treatment and control group after controlling for the 
covariates (shown in Figure 1.1). γ captures the difference in the 
probability of the dependent variable between after and before for the 
control groups. That is, how the law affects non-mothers. Finally, δ is 
the treatment effect. This is the diff-in-diff estimator. It shows the 
increase in the gap coming specifically for the policy implementation on 
target group and not for external factors. 
Results	
Before presenting the results of the direct impact of the law, we present 
some descriptives which help characterize the main demographic and 
                                           
1		 If we estimate using three years as after group in case workers need some time to be 
informed about the policy, the result is 28,57% stronger (3,6% versus 2,8%). In order to 
check the robustness of this analysis, it has been also done taken as before period 
between 1997 and 1999; as after period between 2001-2004 or 2001-2003. Also 
periods has been modified in the placebo test. In general the results are broadly the 
same. 
2  Rodriguez-Planas, N. and Fernández-Kranz, D. 2011 have different periods, as 
before they include six years from 1994 to 1999 and as after group three years from 
2001 to 2003. 
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job characteristics of the treatment and control groups before and after 
the law was passed. These are presented in Table 1.1.   
Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics. SCPS (1998-2002) 
 Treated  Control  
 Pre-Law Post-Law Pre-Law Post-Law 
     
Part Time rate 12.76 16.53 8.94 8.93 
 (0.33) (0.37) (0.28) (0.28) 
     
Age 34.27 34.87 32.39 32.61 
 (3.99) (4.05) (5.09) (5.20) 
Head 10.22 12.16 14.8 16.64 
 (0.30) (0.32) (0.35) (0.37) 
Education     
Low 24.68 21.56 27.14 23.4 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.44) (0.42) 
Medium 33.46 24.17 39.4 25.69 
 (0.47) (0.43) (0.49) (0.44) 
High 41.86 53.73 33.46 50.9 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) 
     
Sector     
Primary 0.53 0.32 0.46 0.24 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
Industry 11.6 12.42 13.18 14.78 
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) 
Construction 0.97 2.04 1.44 1.81 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) 
Services 86.89 85.22 84.93 83.17 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.37) 
The sample contains married females under indefinite contract between 25 and 
45. 
Treated group: Mothers with children between 0 and 5 years old. 
Control group: Non-mothers. 
 
The first two columns present changes for the treatment group before 
and after the passing of the law. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of part-time workers, and their number increases by 29.5%, 
from 12.7% to 16.5%. With respect to the covariates, it can be seen that 
the proportion of heads of household also increases (remember that this 
law aims to help people to combine child-care and work, so mothers in 
particular seem to increase slightly their roles as heads of households). 
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Another noticeable feature is that education levels increase significantly, 
with the proportion of highly educated mothers up from 41.86% to 
53.73% (a rise of 28.35 percentage points), probably because of the 
increasing trend in the educational attainment. Such a big increase is 
partly due to the increasing trend in educational attainment outcomes, 
although most of the change is due to a methodological change 
introduced in 2000 with the codification of the variable "Educational 
Level". Unfortunately, there is not an exact correspondence between the 
two codes, and this is reflected in a higher proportion of individuals with 
university degree which were codified as having "secondary education" 
studies before 2000. Fortunately, such methodological change does not 
affect the results of our estimations, as we have tried several empirical 
specifications and none of them change the results. The construction 
sector also becomes more common for mothers.  
Comparing mothers with non-mothers, note that before the passing of 
the law the proportion of mothers working PT was 3.82 percentage 
points (p.p.) higher than that of non-mothers (control group), as shown 
in Figure 1.1. However, after 1999 this difference rises to 7.6 p.p., i.e. 
3.78 p.p. higher than before, which means a 100% increase. This 
increase can be related to the effect of the law. With respect to 
differences in demographic characteristics, the treatment group is 
somewhat older than the control group, which is expected as we impose 
the condition that the latter must be non-mothers. Finally, non-mothers 
were employed more in the construction and industry sectors before the 
law but after the law treated mothers increased their participation in 
construction.  
Table 1.2 presents the main coefficients of interest from the estimation 
of equation [1.1]. The first column displays the results from the 
unconditional estimation - no covariates are included. The second 
presents the conditional results of the analysis, where controls are 
included. These are the results from estimating equation [1.1].   
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Table 1.2. Results of direct effect. SCPS (1998-2002) 
 Equation [1] Equation [2] 
VARIABLES Part-time Part-time 
   
treated 0.0409*** 0.0516*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00914) 
after -0.000131 -0.0162 
 (0.0128) (0.0227) 
treatedafter 0.0351** 0.0286** 
 (0.0161) (0.0150) 
Covariates No Yes 
   
obs. P 0.1272059 0.1272059 
pred. P 0.1244879 0.1058416 
R-square 0.0115 0.084 
Observations 9,520 9,520 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Control variables include age, a dummy indicating whether the individual 
is the household head, sector, level of education, tenure, unemployment, 
partiality, temporary and birth rate by region and year. Marginal effects are 
reported. 
 
The first issue to be pointed out is that the unconditional (column 1) 
and conditional (column 2) impacts are very similar. This suggests that 
the covariates are uncorrelated with the treatment and just generate 
more precise estimates of the causal effect of interest.  
More specifically, and consistent with Figure 1.1, conditional on 
observables, before the enactment of the law mothers of young children 
were more likely to work PT than non-mothers, as the variable treated 
(β) is statistically significant at the 1% significance level and stands at 
5.2 percentage points (marginal effects shown in the Table), which 
represents the gap in the figure. The coefficient of interest reported in 
the third row (treated*after), δ, estimates the effect of the policy on PT 
work for eligible mothers compared to non-mothers. It can be clearly 
observed that the law affects the target group. All else being equal, after 
the implementation of the law a woman with small children and an 
indefinite contract is around 3 percentage points more likely to work 
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PT). This is equivalent to an increase of 18% in the likelihood of working 
part-time for the target group, considering that the predicted 
probability (controlling for covariates) of working PT before the 
implementation of the law for the treatment group is 15.74% (10.58 + 
5.16).  The table also shows that the law did not affect non-target 
women under indefinite contracts because the variable after (γ) is not 
statistically significant. This means that is can be strongly argued that 
the unobservables in the control group remain constant, which makes 
our comparison more robust. 
To obtain the probability of working part-time for treated mothers after 
the law all effects (β + γ + δ) must be added together. After the law 
treated women were 8 percentage points (5.16 + 0 + 2.86) more likely 
to work PT than similar women without children, i.e. they show a 
predicted probability of 18.6%.  
Robustness	Check	
As a robustness check we implement several tests, all of which are 
shown in Table 1.3.  
Column 1 present the results of a placebo test, conducted to ensure that 
the impact estimated is caused by the family friendly policy and not by 
other, external factors correlated with it. This placebo analysis consists 
of “pretending” that the treatment happened earlier and then measuring 
the outcome after the pretend treatment but before the actual treatment 
takes place. If this artificial treatment is found to have an effect then 
that effect becomes a specification test for the common trend 
assumption, because any estimated nonzero effect would have to be 
interpreted as selection bias and thus would cast serious doubts on the 
validity of the identifying assumptions. 
Hence, we estimate the same difference-in-differences models for a 
period in which no change in family-friendly laws took place. We use the 
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same pre-reform period of 1998-1999 (excluding post-1999 data) for 
these estimates but we simulate a false post-reform period. For the 
placebo test we consider the periods “after” 1996 and 1997. This period 
is chosen in order to find the most similar group to 1998-1999 (nearest 
in time) for comparison, and to avoid changes in the likelihood of part-
time work for external reasons. For the placebo test the sample includes 
8,784 females: 6,078 mothers and 2,706 non-mothers. 
Table 1.3. Robustness checks of direct effect. SCPS (1996-2004) 
 [1]     [2]  [3] 
VARIABLES Part-time Part-time Part-time 
    
treated 0.0462*** 0.0519*** 0.0530*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00919) (0.00936) 
after 0.000437 -0.00549 0.0734 
 (0.0124) (0.0232) (0.0552) 
Treated*aft
er 
0.00510 0.0327** 0.0592*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0154) (0.0159) 
    
obs. P 0.1125911 0.1260045 0.130041
7 
pred. P 0.0916341 0.1042417 0.109790
3 
R-square 0.0865 0.0863 0.0816 
Observation
s 
8,784 8,960 10,066 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Additional controls include age, a dummy indicating whether the 
individual is the household head, sector, level of education, tenure, 
unemployment, partiality, temporary and birth rate by region and year. 
Marginal effects are reported. 
 
Columns:  
[1] Placebo: “after” period includes years 1996 and 1997. 
[2] Treated group includes only mothers with children born before the pass of 
the law.  
[3] Medium-term effect: “after” period includes years 2003 and 2004. 
 
 
The results of the placebo regression are shown in column 1 of Table 
1.3. It can be seen that the coefficient of interest - treated*after, is not 
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significantly different from zero, which means that if the 1996-1998 
period had been the “after-the-law” years, no differential use of part-
time work would have been found across mothers with children younger 
than 6 years of age and non-mothers. This implies that if the law had 
not actually been implemented no changes would have been observed in 
the incidence of PT versus full-time work for mothers with children 
younger than 6 years old compared to non-mothers. This confirms that 
the result presented above is caused by the implementation of the law 
and not by any spurious or unobservable factor. 
The second robustness check looks for any bias as a result of potential 
endogeneity of the treatment group: This might arise if some non-
mothers, knowing that the implementation of the family friendly policy 
is imminent and attracted by its advantages, decide to become mothers 
and hence switch from the control to the treatment group. To check 
whether this potential effect plays any role, we eliminate from our 
treatment group those mothers with children born just after the passing 
of the law, i.e. those with children under 1 year old in 2001 and under 2 
in 2002. The result is shown in the second column. There is hardly any 
change with respect to the result in Table 1.2. Therefore, it seems that 
women do not decide to become mothers attracted by the advantages 
offered by the policy.  
The third and last robustness check is intended to evaluate whether the 
impact reported above is just a short-run effect or is sustained over 
time. To that end we use the 2003-2004 as the “after” group. Results 
are shown in Column 3. The treatment effect (δ) in the medium-term is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level and amounts to 5.92 
percentage points. This is equivalent to an increase of 36.4% in the 
likelihood of working part-time for our target group in the medium-
term, considering that the predicted likelihood (controlling for the 
covariates) of working part-time for the treatment group before the 
implementation of the law is 16.28% (10.98 + 5.3). It can be concluded 
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that the effect is not transient. Indeed, the likelihood of resorting to the 
law seems to increase over time. One possible explanation for that 
increase is that it takes time for knowledge of the existence of the policy 
to spread, and its use has increased as it has become progressively 
better known. Therefore, the main conclusion regarding this first, direct 
impact of the law is that the passing of the policy increased the use of 
part-time work by target mothers by about 18%. To some extent, thus, 
the law succeeded in its main aim.  
1.4.2. Impact of the law: indirect effect    
 Next we analyze the extent to which the passing of the law has 
had perverse effects on its potential future users (what we denote by its 
“indirect effect”). The potential users of the law are non-mothers of 
fertile age, given that it is mothers with small children who account for 
the increase in the use of part-time work for childcare reasons after the 
passing of the law, as shown in the previous section.  
 The pervasive effect analyzed in this section is whether this law 
has led employers to behave strategically in the sense of anticipating 
the law when hiring workers, depending on whether they are potential 
users or not. This might be the case if employers feel that the use of 
part-time reduced and the increased protection from dismissal that 
these workers may enjoy impose additional restrictions on them. If so, 
and if the family friendly policy is costly for firms, employers might be 
more likely to hire potential users of the law under fixed-term rather 
than indefinite contracts. Under fixed-term contracts employers are not 
forced to renew the contracts when workers become eligible to use the 
law, so those workers would not enjoy the greater protection against 
dismissal. Therefore the treatment group in this analysis comprises 
non-mothers (who are potential future users of the law) and the 
outcome variable is the probability of having a fixed-term contract, 
measured before and after the law. As before, we focus on salaried 
workers of fertile age (between 25 and 45 years old).  
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As the control group, we use non-fathers in the same age bracket. 
Another potential control group might be all male salaried workers, not 
only non-fathers. To decide which of the two control groups seem more 
appropriate, we compare the trends in the proportions of fixed-term 
contracts for these two groups (non-fathers and all male salaried 
workers) and the treatment group. Figure 1.2 depicts those proportions. 
It can be seen that the trends for non-fathers and non-mothers look 
very similar before the passing of the law (30.5%) but diverge after it: 
They increase for non-mothers but not for non-fathers. This is not the 
case for all salaried workers, who exhibit remarkable differences in the 
use of fixed-term contracts in the years previous to the passing of the 
law. Hence, we find it more appropriate to use the group of non-fathers 
aged between 25 and 45 as the control group. Our final sample covers 
20,118 individuals: 11,332 non-fathers and 8,786 non-mothers.  
Figure 1.2. Fix-term rate. SCPS (1992-2004). Individuals between 25 
and 45 years: non-fathers and non-mothers without children and all 
men 
 
	
Methodology	
To conduct this second analysis we again use SCPS and a difference-in-
differences method. The regression is the same as in the previous 
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analysis but now the dependent variable is the probability of being hired 
under a fixed-term contract. And as mentioned, we now focus on a 
sample of non-mothers (treatment group) and non-fathers (control 
group) aged between 25 and 45.   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡#$ =	 = 	𝛼 + 𝛽 · 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 	𝛾 · 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛿 · 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 +	𝑋5#$𝜋 + ɛ#$													 1.2  
where t indexes the year and i the individual; and where  𝐷#  = 1 if 
individual i receives the treatment (potential mothers) and zero 
otherwise (potential fathers), 𝐷$ = 1 if observation is after the treatment 
(2001 or 2002) and zero if the observation is before the treatment 
(1998 and 1999). 𝑋#$  is a vector of covariates (same as in previous 
analysis). Finally, ɛ#$ is a zero mean disturbance. 
β is the non-treatment effect. A non-significantly different from zero 
coefficient would reveal that, all else being equal, the treatment and 
control groups exhibited similar proportions of fixed-term contracts 
before the passing of the law. γ captures a potential indirect impact of 
the law on non-fathers – i.e. a change in the probability of fixed-term 
hiring.  δ is the treatment effect, i.e. the change in the likelihood of 
being hired under fixed-term contracts for non-mothers after the law 
versus before the law compared to non-fathers. A significant positive 
coefficient would indicate that the law increased the probability of non-
mothers being hired under fixed-term contracts as compared to the 
corresponding non-fathers.   
Results	
Before presenting the results of the estimation, we present some 
descriptive statistics. Table 1.4 shows the proportions of fixed-term 
contracts and other average values of the independent variables for the 
treatment and control groups before and after the passing of the law.  
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Table 1.4. Descriptive Statistics. SCPS (1998-2002) 
 Treated  Control  
 Pre-Law Post-Law Pre-Law Post-Law 
     
Fixed-Term 
rate 
30.48 34.91 30.55 30.64 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) 
     
Age 32.82 32.91 33.27 33.46 
 (5.55) (5.56) (5.27) (5.35) 
Head 36.82 39.01 80.28 82.17 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.40) (0.38) 
Educ     
Low 27.74 24.74 42.36 38.88 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.49) (.49) 
Medium 34.63 22.85 35.49 24.38 
 (0.48) (0.42) (0.49) (0.43) 
High 37.62 52.41 22.15 36.74 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.42) (0.48) 
     
Sector     
Primary 1.05 1 3.87 3.97 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Industry 11.8 11.16 24.4 23.85 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.43) (0.43) 
Construction 1.2 1.72 11.49 14.89 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.32) (0.35) 
Services 85.95 86.12 60.24 57.28 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.49) (0.49) 
Individuals without children between 25 and 45 years old 
Treated: Potential mothers. Control: Potential fathers. 
 
A comparison of non-mothers (treatment group) before and after the 
law shows a significant increase in the proportion of fixed-term 
contacts - from 30.48 to 34.91% (15.5%). We discuss below whether this 
increase is due to the “indirect effect” of the law that we seek to test. In 
regard to the covariates, it can be seen that the education level is higher 
after the passing of the law than before for non-mothers aged between 
25 and 45. The proportion of non-mothers with university degree 
increases from 37.6% in 1998-1999 to 52.4% three years later. As 
mentioned before, such a big increase is mostly due to a methodological 
change introduced in 2000. As before, we have checked with different 
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specifications on the educational indicator,  and observed that results 
are not affected by this methodological change. 
A comparison between non-mothers and non-fathers (control group) 
reveals that before the passing of the law the proportion of fixed-term 
contracts is the same for both (30.5%), but for non-fathers it remains 
unchanged afterwards. This reinforces our confidence in the suitability 
of this group as a control group. Sectorial separation is noticeable when 
non-mothers are compared with non-fathers, both before and after the 
passing of the law. This is also the case with the whole sample of female 
and male workers. Women are highly concentrated in services, and their 
incidence in industry and construction is really low.  
Table 1.5 presents the main coefficients of interest from the estimation 
of equation [1.2]. Column 1 displays the unconditional impact, i.e. with 
no additional covariates. Column 2 shows the conditional impact on the 
observable covariates.  
The coefficients of the two estimations are very close, which indicates 
that the set of covariates are uncorrelated with the treatment. On the 
other hand, the estimation fit increases notably, as indicated by the 
increase in the R-square.   
From Column 2 it can be concluded that firms seem to behave 
strategically: all else being equal, after the passing of the law non-
mothers between 25 and 45 years are 5.33 percentage points more 
likely to be hired under a fixed-term contract than the corresponding 
non-fathers. This increase is significantly different from zero, which 
means that an unintended and unexpected effect of this law has been to 
increase the hiring of potential mothers under fixed-term contracts to 
prevent them from having the right to reduce their working hours and 
enjoy greater protection against dismissal. That increase makes the 
likelihood of women being hired under fixed-term contracts around 18% 
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higher, given that before the crisis that likelihood was 30%. In addition, 
given that the impact of the variable treated is not significant, it can be 
concluded that similar non-mothers and non-fathers were equally likely 
to be hired under indefinite contracts before 1999. Finally, as the impact 
of the indicator “after” is not significant either, it can be concluded that 
for non-fathers the law had no impact on the likelihood of being hired 
under indefinite contracts.  
Table 1.5. Results of indirect effect. SCPS (1998-2002) 
 [1] [2] 
VARIABLES Fixed-term Fixed-term 
   
treated -0.000753 0.0197* 
 (0.00981) (0.0110) 
after 0.000831 0.000818 
 (0.00880) (0.0101) 
treatedafter 0.0435*** 0.0533*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0140) 
Covariates No Yes 
   
obs. P 0.3159331 0.3159331 
pred. P 0.3157668 0.3007602 
R-square 0.0013 0.0919 
Observations 20,115 20,115 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Control variables include age, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the 
household head, sector, level of education, tenure, unemployment, partiality, 
temporary and birth rate by region and year. Marginal effects are reported. 
 
 
Robustness	Check	
The tests shown in Table 1.6 were conducted as robustness checks on 
the estimated indirect effect.  
As before, we first run a placebo test, presented in the first column. In 
particular, we use 1996-1998 as a fictitious “after” interval, as we did 
with the direct effect. For the placebo test the sample includes 16,858 
individuals: 9,565 men and 7,293 women. Column 1 indicates that the 
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treatment effect – the δ coefficient - is not statistically significant. So if 
a fictitious “after” period is used no significant increase is found in the 
use of fixed-term contracts for non-mothers with respect to non-
fathers. This supports the assumption that our previous results on the 
effects of the family-friendly law were not spurious, and adds 
robustness to the previous result that the passing of the law made it 
more likely for non-mothers than for non-fathers to be hired under 
fixed-term contracts.  
Table 1.6. Robustness checks of indirect effect. SCPS (1996-2004) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Fixed-
term 
Fixed-term 
   
treated 0.0319*** 0.262 
 (0.0113) (0.376) 
after 0.0113 -0.00484 
 (0.0103) (0.0115) 
treatedafter 0.0131 0.0457* 
 (0.0149) (0.0252) 
   
obs. P 0.315533
4 
0.3201716 
pred. P 0.296783
6 
0.3068873 
R-square 0.1024 0.0834 
Observation
s 
16,854 21,907 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Additional controls include age, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the 
household head, sector, level of education, tenure, unemployment, partiality, 
temporary and birth rate by region and year. Marginal effects are reported. 
Columns:  
[1] Placebo: after period includes years 1996 and 1997. 
[2] Medium-term effect: after period includes years 2003 and 2004 
 
 
The second robustness check evaluates whether the impact is felt only 
in the short run or is sustained over time. Again, we use the years 2003 
and 2004 as the “after” group. Results are shown in Column 2. The 
42 
 
treatment effect (δ) is statistically significant at 10%. This may arise if 
the anticipatory behavior by employers vanishes over time. Therefore, 
the main conclusion reached concerning the indirect impact of the 
policy is that its passing made it more likely for non-mothers than non-
fathers in similar circumstances to be hired under fixed-term contracts, 
but it seems that the effect disappears over time.  
1.5. Family friendly policy: Profiles of users of 
the law and the impact of the Great Recession 
The second aim of the paper is to characterize the personal and job 
profiles of users of Family Friendly Law 39/99 (referred to hereafter as 
“users of the Law”) and to quantify the extent to which the Great 
Recession has changed the number and characteristics of the users of 
the Law. As mentioned in the introduction, on one side it might be 
expected that in an economic downturn increased fears of being 
dismissed would lead to an increase in the use of work time reduction 
as a way of obtaining greater protection against dismissal. By contrast, 
income effects might have a negative impact, as work time reduction 
entails proportional wage reduction, and this negative income effect is 
likely to be more important in a recession.  
Data	and	Descriptive		
The Continuous Sample of Work Histories enables individuals who make 
use of the law to be identified. As mentioned in the Data Section, we 
merge all the years in the CSWH from 2007 to 2013 and keep all 
individuals who register any work contract from 2000 onwards. We 
restrict our sample to workers who have had children at some time 
between 2000 and 2011. We compute a quarterly panel and divide the 
whole sample into two periods: contracts between 2004 and 2007 
(denoted as the expansionary period), and contracts between 2008 and 
2011 (denoted as the recession period). Accordingly, we only keep 
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episodes from 2004 in order to avoid possible bias caused when we 
require individuals to remain in the Social Security records in 2005.  
Under the legal context in our reference period, employers cannot 
change their workers’ working hours without the workers’ consent. The 
2012 Labor Reform changes the legal context and allows employers to 
reduce the working hours of their employees in some specific situations, 
so we only measure the impact of the crisis up to the end of 2011. 
Hence, for the period under consideration we assume that all changes 
from full-time to part-time in the same firm are voluntary. Therefore, in 
principle we identify any employee who uses the right to change her/his 
full-time contract to a part-time contract within the same firm when 
having a child of the permitted age as a user of the Law. 
However, the number of men who declare that they work PT due to 
child-care issues is less than 1% , and this pattern seems to remain 
constant over time. Therefore, we exclude men from this analysis, as the 
proportion of users of the law among them is negligible. 
Second, only workers under indefinite contracts are really protected 
against dismissal since under fixed-term contracts employers are not 
forced to renew workers’ contracts. In fact, we find an insignificant 
number of fixed-term contract workers who reduced their working 
hours on having a child. For that reason we focus on workers with 
indefinite contracts in analyzing users of the Law and the impact of the 
recession.  
To identify non-users of the Law we focus on all those potential users 
who decided not to change their working hours even though they were 
legal entitled to. We define a “non-user” as any mother with children of 
the permitted age with a full-time (indefinite) contract who maintains 
the same type of contract in the next period if she remains at the same 
firm.  
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The sample contains 2,578 different users. It covers 835,713 
observations (woman per quarter), 20,259 of which are from users of 
the Law. Figure 1.3 depicts the proportion of mothers in the pool of 
eligible potential users who make use of the Law quarter by quarter. On 
average, in the period 2004-2007 the proportion of users is 2.46%, 
while in 2008-2011 it decreases to 2.40%. As Figure 1.3 shows, there is 
a sudden jump of 17% precisely when the law extends the permitted age 
of children by two years (23rd March 2007). This jump is due to the fact 
that the increase in the number of mothers eligible is greater than that 
in the number of actual users. Gradually, the proportion of users drops 
back to former levels because users of the Law extend their reduced 
working hours until their child turns 8 years old.  
Figure 1.3. Proportion of Law Users. CSWH (2007-2013).              
Mothers under indefinite contract that have changed to part-time in the 
same firm vs those that stayed working full-time.
 
 
Table 1.7 characterizes users of the Law for different periods. In the 
upturn period the typical profile of a user of the Law is a women in her 
thirties, of Spanish nationality, with between 2 and 7 years of tenure, 
working as clerical officer or assistant in a small firm in the service 
sector. However, with the onset of the recession the profile changes to 
some extent: First, the proportion of over 40s increases relatively in the 
recession. Second, the proportion of foreign workers among users 
increases by 60% in the recession period. Third, the average tenure of 
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users of the Law also increases. In terms of occupational classification 
groups, users can be divided into white-collar (the first seven groups) 
and blue-collar (the last four groups). Except for technical engineers 
and experts and qualified assistants, a greater decrease in the number 
of users of the Law is observed among white-collar workers than among 
blue-collar ones in the recession, compared with the previous upturn. In 
addition, users of the law are over-represented in small firms (with 
fewer than 10 employees) before and after 2008.  
As can be seen, the characteristics of users of the Law seem to change 
considerably in the recession period. This change is perfectly 
understandable if it is taken into account that although the large-scale 
dismissals brought on by the Great recession hit workers with fixed-
term contracts harder, they also affected those with indefinite ones.  
Methodology	and	Results		
Our first aim is to estimate the determinants of “being a user of the 
Law” and how they change over the business cycle. We compare mothers 
who reduce their working hours in their firms (users) with those who 
decide to stay full-time (non-users) even though they are entitled to 
take reductions. Table 1.7 shows a compositional change in users, 
which must be controlled for when estimating the determinants of being 
a user of the Law. We do this by estimating two non-linear probit 
models separately. Among the covariates used in the estimations we 
include age (in intervals), a dummy indicating whether the mother is 
Spanish or a foreign national, tenure (in intervals), occupational 
classification group (white and blue collar), size of the firm (in intervals), 
9 indicators of sector of activity, and regional fixed effects. Our 
reference profile is a woman between 30 and 34, of Spanish nationality, 
with 2- 7 years of tenure, in a white-collar job, and working at a small 
firm. Table 1.8 presents the results for the expansionary period (2004-
2007) in its first column, and for the recession period (2008-2011) in 
its second. 
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Table 1.7. Descriptive Statistics. Panel from CSWH (2004-2011) 
 Expansion       
2004-2007 
Recession            
2008-2011 
N. of observations 8,032  12,227  
Proportion of users 2.46%  2.40%  
     
Age     
 34.25 (5.04) 35.436 (5.93) 
     
< 30 15.39 (0.36) 15.02 (0.35) 
30-34 36.89 (0.48) 29.49 (0.45) 
35- 39 34.85 (0.48) 31.94 (0.47) 
≥ 40 12.87 (0.33) 23.55 (0.42) 
     
Foreign 6.47 (0.24) 10.39 (0.31) 
     
     
Tenure (years) 5.143 (3.785) 5.778 (3.97) 
     
< 2 year 20.06 (0.40) 15.57 (0.36) 
2 - 7 years 57.26 (0.49) 51.44 (0.50) 
≥ 7 years 22.68 (0.42) 32.98 (0.47) 
     
Contribution group     
Graduates, engineers and 
senior management 
6.47 (0.25) 5.47 (0.23) 
Technical engineers, 
experts and qualified 
assistants 
6.01 (0.24) 7.17 (0.26) 
Administrative and 
workshop managers 
2.64 (0.16) 1.87 (0.16) 
Unqualified assistants 2.94 (0.16) 2.41 (0.15) 
Administrative officers 22.34 (0.41) 18.25 (0.38) 
Subaltern 5.39 (0.23) 4.24 (0.20) 
Administrative Assistants 25.76 (0.44) 23.42 (0.42) 
First and second officers 7.11 (0.26) 8.64 (0.29) 
Third officers and 
specialists 
9.51 (0.29) 11.3 (0.31) 
Laborers 11.79 (0.32) 16.61 (0.37) 
Workers under 18 0.04 (0.02) 0.61 (0.08) 
     
Size firm     
< 10 34.77 (0.48) 36.68 (0.48) 
10-49 24.91 (0.43) 23.8 (0.43) 
50-499 24.02 (0.42) 25.71 (0.44) 
≥500 16.3 (0.37) 13.81 (0.35) 
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Sector     
     
Primary 0.36 (0.06) 0.2 (0.04) 
Industry 11.21 (0.31) 9.52 (0.29) 
Construction 8.63 (0.28) 11.7 (0.32) 
Wholesale 0.00 (0.00) 8.85 (0.28) 
Housing 0.41 (0.06) 0.34 (0.06) 
Administrative 2.29 (0.15) 5.49 (0.23) 
Education 5.49 (0.23) 5.11 (0.22) 
Health 15.29 (0.36) 15.29 (0.36) 
Communication and 
transports 
26.82 (0.44) 16.88 (0.37) 
Finances 1.52 (0.12) 1.75 (0.13) 
Other services 27.99 (0.45) 24.88 (0.43) 
The sample contains females under indefinite contract that reduced time-
schedule in the same firm, that is, users of the law. 
 
Table 1.8 presents the different impacts of the covariates on the 
likelihood of being a user of the policy throughout the business cycle. 
After 2007 women under 30 use the Law more than our reference 
group, contrary to the situation before the crisis. Mothers over 40 are 
56% more likely to use the Law in the recession period than the 
reference group of women. Having more than 7 years of tenure, being a 
blue-collar worker, and working at a small firm seem to be stronger 
determinants for using the Law in the recession than in the preceding 
period. Summarizing, Tables 1.7 and 1.8 reveal that there is not only a 
compositional change in the sample of non-users, but also a change in 
the impact of the determinants of being a user of the Law. This must be 
taken into account when estimating the impact of the recession on 
users.  
The second aim of this section is to quantify the extent to which the 
Great Recession led to a change in the number of users of the Law. In 
other words, we seek to estimate the effect of the recession on the use 
of the Law. As mentioned above, on the one hand the Recession might 
be expected to lead more workers to use the Law to protect themselves 
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from dismissal, but on the other hand income effects and probably also 
a fear of reprisals might have the opposite effect.  
Table 1.8. Probability of being a “39/99 Law User”. Panel from CSWH 
(2004-2011) 
 2004-2007 2008-2011 
VARIABLES user user 
   
< 30 -0.00165** 0.00295*** 
 (0.000715) (0.000643) 
35- 39 -0.00168*** -0.00281*** 
 (0.000572) (0.000444) 
≥ 40 -0.00913*** -0.00397*** 
 (0.000586) (0.000459) 
Foreign 0.00559*** 0.00403*** 
 (0.00122) (0.000711) 
< 2 year -0.0213*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.000523) (0.000397) 
≥ 7 years 0.00102 0.0111*** 
 (0.000658) (0.000567) 
Blue collar 0.00392*** 0.00753*** 
 (0.000609) (0.000446) 
10-49 0.000546 -0.00635*** 
 (0.000659) (0.000414) 
50-499 -0.00377*** -0.00842*** 
 (0.000608) (0.000411) 
≥500 -0.00284*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.000695) (0.000408) 
   
obs. P 0.0245996 0.0240249 
pred. P 0.0209251 0.0185842 
R-square 0.037 0.0563 
Observations 326,509 508,931 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The sample contains mothers under indefinite contract that stay in the same firm. The 
two columns estimate the probability of being a law user (have reduced time schedule) 
along 2004-2007 and 2008-2011, respectively.  
Reference groups: belong to 30-34 age group, native, tenure between 2 and 7 years, 
white collar, small firms, health sector and working in Madrid. 
Sector of activity and fix region dummies are also included in the 
estimations.  
Marginal effects are reported. 
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To answer this question we estimate the probability of being a user of 
the Law, but include indicators for the recession period. Table 1.9 
displays the results. Each column shows the effect of the family friendly 
policy allowing for differential impacts before and after 2008. The 
variable denoted by crisis takes a value of 0 if the observation belongs 
to the expansion period (2004-2007) and 1 if it belongs to any quarter 
in the recession (2008 onwards). Column (1) represents the effect of the 
crisis variable itself with no controls for observables (raw impact). In that 
context, the variable crisis does not capture any changes in use - notice 
that R-square is 0, which makes the model unreliable. In the second 
column we control for the same variables as in previous estimations (in 
Table 1.8) and maintain the profile of the reference group of woman. 
The impact of the variable crisis is statistically significant at 1% and the 
impacts amount to -0.0027; i.e. in the recession period mothers are 
0.27 percentage points less likely to use the Law than in the expansion 
period. To measure the scale of the impact we need to compare it with 
the likelihood of using the Law in the pre-crisis period. For example, the 
average predicted likelihood of a woman in the reference group using 
the Law is 1.98% (predicted likelihood). Hence, the impact of the 
recession takes the form of a decrease in use of 13.6%.  
This result assumes that the impact of each control variable is invariant 
to the period under consideration, i.e. pre-recession or recession 
period. However, this might not be the case. As shown previously, there 
is not only a significant compositional change in the group of users of 
the Law between the pre-crisis and recession years but also a change in 
the impacts of the different determinants. Hence, the impact of the 
recession found here might be biased as it might capture not only the 
impact of the recession itself but also compositional changes that have 
not been taken into account.  
To control for these changes in composition, we conduct a within-cell 
estimation as follows:  
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We identify the cells for which relevant changes in composition (and in 
impacts) are observed in users of the Law before and during the 
recession, and then we estimate the likelihood of being a user within 
cells so as to compare women with very similar characteristics when 
measuring the impact of the recession on the use of the law. This means 
that the variable “crisis” captures the difference in the likelihood of 
using the Law among mothers within cells, hence preventing the 
coefficient estimated from capturing the effects caused by the change in 
composition or the non-normal distribution of the unobservables.  
Table 1.9. Probability of being a “39/99 Law User” over the business 
cycle. Panel from CSWH (2004-2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES user user user user 
     
crisis -0.000554 -0.00270*** -0.00262*** -0.00265*** 
 (0.000346) (0.000318) (0.000317) (0.000313) 
     
obs. P 0.0242416 0.0242416 0.0242416 0.0242416 
pred. P 0.0242403 0.0197943 0.0197137 0.0193161 
R-square 0 0.0451 0.0458 0.0498 
Observations 835,713 835,713 835,713 835,713 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
The sample contains mothers under indefinite contract that stays in the same 
firm. Group of age, foreign dummy, tenure, size, contribution group, sector of 
activity and fix region dummies are also included in the estimations. Marginal 
effects are reported. 
 
Columns:  
(1) Without covariates. 
(2) Same covariates than in Table 1.8. 
(3) Group A: cells of foreign/native, 3 groups of tenure and blue/white 
collar. Rest of control variables included in the estimation in a vector of 
covariates.  
(4) Group B: cells of 4 groups of age, 4 groups of size, 3 groups of tenure 
and blue/white collar. Rest of control variables included in the estimation in a 
vector of covariates. 
 
 
Given that compositional changes mainly affect the proportion of 
foreign/Spanish nationals, tenure and job qualifications, we create 12 
cells with all possible combinations of (i) foreign/Spanish nationality; (ii) 
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tenure (three groups); and (iii) job qualifications (white collar/blue 
collar). In addition to controlling by cells, we also include indicators of 
age group, firm size, sector of activity, and regional fixed effects. The 
reference profile is the same as before.  The results of the within-cell 
estimation and the rest of the covariates are shown in the third column. 
There is barely any change with respect to column (2): there is a 
reduction of 0.262 percentage points in the use of the Law during the 
recession. In other words, a woman in the reference group becomes 
13.2% less likely to be a user of the Law.  
Finally, the last column presents a similar analysis using a more 
restricted cell grouping. In particular, we add age groups (4) and firm 
size (4). Given that the group of foreign workers is not big, we do not 
include foreign/Spanish nationality as an additional characteristic for the 
cell so as to prevent empty cells. Hence, we end up with 72 different 
cells. Results of the within-cell estimation with more restrictive cell 
characterization are presented in column (4). The results do not change: 
0.265 percentage points in the use of the Law after 2007. This means 
that during the recession likelihood drops by 13.7% for the reference 
group of women.  
In summary, with regard to the impact of the recession on users of the 
Law we find that the recession has led to a decrease in their number of 
around 13%. This result suggests that negative income effects and 
perhaps fears of reprisal have outweighed potential greater protection 
against dismissal. 
1.6. Summary and Conclusions  
Family issues play a crucial role in understanding the gender differences 
observed in the labor market. Women combine employment with home 
responsibilities to a much larger extent than their male partners. 
Governments and institutions may play an important role in creating the 
legal framework for improving women’s choices and their participation 
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in the economy, and in helping societies to break away from the more 
traditional gender role attitudes that affect women’s behavior in many 
countries. Indeed, in the past few decades policies aimed at promoting 
gender equality and equity in the workplace have been adopted. The 
evaluation of one such policy implemented in Spain in 1999 is the aim 
of this paper.  
The policy under analysis, called Law 39/99, was particularly aimed at 
granting parents with children younger than 6 years of age the right to 
reduce their working hours, with an equivalent wage reduction. The 
spirit of this law is to enable parents more easily to afford to stay in the 
labor market and take care of their children by reducing their working 
hours. Moreover, users of the Law enjoy greater protection against 
dismissal than other workers, which may encourage workers to use the 
law as a job protection particularly in recession periods.  
In this paper we evaluate the impact of the law, in particular its direct 
and indirect effects. Our results indicate first that the law increased the 
likelihood of working part-time for eligible mothers – i.e. mothers with 
children under 6 - by around 18% (almost 3 percentage points) 
compared to similar non-target groups. Second, we test whether the 
passing of the law led to strategic behavior from employers in the sense 
of offering fewer indefinite contracts to potential users of the law so as 
to limit the use of reduced working hours. A comparison of hiring 
practices involving potential users of the law (target group), i.e. non-
mothers of fertile age, with a similar non-target group (non-fathers of 
fertile age) reveals that the law increased the likelihood of the target 
group being hired under fixed-term contracts by 5.33 percentage points 
(18%). From a policy point of view, we can conclude that the 
implementation of a well-intended policy that in principle is granted to 
both fathers and mothers, may have perverse effects if only a sub-group 
of workers -in this particular case mothers- makes use of the family-
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friendly policy, given their traditionally higher responsibility for 
childcare issues.  
The second aim of the study is to characterize the workers who have 
made use of the Law since its approval (1999) and measure the extent 
to which the Great Recession has led to a change in the number of users 
and in their personal and job profiles. We find that the profiles of users 
of the Law in the downturn have changed from those in the previous 
upturn. Before the crisis they are mainly women in their thirties in 
white-collar jobs, but during the downturn they are low-qualified 
workers older than 40 who work in small firms. The most important 
finding is that the Great Recession has reduced the likelihood of 
resorting to the Law by more than 13%. This is not consistent with the 
view that eligible workers use the Law during the recent recession 
mainly to protect themselves against dismissal.  
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2.The impact of the 
Minimum Income Scheme 
on Poverty in the Basque 
Country 
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2.1. Introduction  
The Great Recession has had severe consequences in terms of poverty, 
as it has placed many citizens at risk of social exclusion3. As a result, 
Minimum Income Schemes are currently at the heart of public debate. 
Most European Union Member States currently provide some form of 
Minimum Income Scheme so as to ensure a minimum standard of living 
for households when they lack other sources of financial support. These 
schemes have been reinforced in recent times, but they first emerged 
back in 1992, when a European Council recommendation assessed the 
need to develop last resort schemes, which recognized the basic right of 
every individual to be guaranteed a decent minimum standard of living. 
These programs were part of comprehensive, consistent plans to 
combat social exclusion 4 . Since then, implementation of Minimum 
Income Schemes (MIS) across European Countries has varied in terms of 
coverage and target population. The most widely used are the so-called 
"simple and comprehensive schemes", which basically cover every 
person/household in need of support, without confining their effects to 
a particular group of people (de la Rica and Gorjón, 2017).  
This paper assesses the impact of a simple, comprehensive scheme that 
operates in the Basque Country, a region of northern Spain5 , called 
Renta de Garantía de Ingresos. This region pioneered the introduction of 
MIS in Spain in 1989. The first aim of the paper is to assess whether MIS 
                                           
3  The terms poverty and social exclusion are frequently used as if they were 
synonymous, but they describe different concepts. The concept of poverty is generally 
linked to the lack of the resources (income) needed to meet the minimum needs in a 
given society. The concept of social exclusion refers to a lack of or insufficient level of 
social integration (Rodrigues, 2001). 
4 For more details, see Council Recommendation 92/441/EEC of 24 June 1992: 
  http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9953c2cf-a4f8-
4d31-aeed-6bf88a5407f3/language-en 
5 The Basque Country is a small region in the north of Spain with a population of 
approximately 2 million (5% of the Spanish population). The active labor force is over 1 
million and the employment rate is 50%. It is one of the richest regions in Spain, with 
the second highest GDP per capita and the third lowest unemployment rate (12.8%). 
The Basque Human Development Index is 0.924, the highest in the country, and at the 
same level as the Netherlands. 
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achieves its goal of ensuring a decent minimum standard of living for 
Basque citizens. The second question addressed in the paper is to 
assess the intensity to which MIS is effective and efficient in its goal of 
reducing poverty6. MIS costs around 450 million Euros per annum, 4.5% 
of total public expenditure, and equivalent to 0.69% of the region’s GDP. 
Undoubtedly, from an economic point of view, it is pertinent to assess 
the degree of effectiveness and efficiency of such a costly public policy.  
The data for this analysis is microdata sourced from the 2016 Survey of 
Poverty and Social Inequalities (referred to here by its Spanish acronym 
EPDS), which is the latest available wave at this time. According to this 
dataset, in 2016 the Basque population numbered 2.14 million, of 
whom 5.8% were MIS beneficiaries. 59,976 households received this aid 
and the benefit covered 124,493 people. Total expenditure on MIS in 
2016, as reported by the EPDS, was 428.08 million Euros. This dataset 
includes variables for disaggregated monthly income, including the 
amount of MIS transferred to households. This means that a simulation 
of the implementation of MIS can be carried out. By comparing income 
distribution before and after the application of MIS, it is possible to 
measure the impact of the aid on poverty reduction. 
Although poverty is understood as difficulty in accessing those goods 
and services that ensure the ability to live with dignity and lead a 
satisfactory social and personal life (Villar, 2017), there is no single, 
scientific, objective poverty line, i.e. no single threshold that determines 
who is poor and who is not. In this paper I work with three different 
poverty lines.  The first is the poverty threshold used by the Basque 
Government in legislation to provide MIS. Eight types of household are 
defined and a different poverty threshold is specified for each one. The 
                                           
6 According to de la Rica and Gorjón (2017), the MIS does not cause any undesirable 
“delay in entering the labor market” effect, so the presence of the policy does not 
cause poverty to become chronic.   
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Minimum Income Scheme supplements household income for those 
households which all short of the particular threshold for their type.  
Secondly, the paper also considers two relative poverty lines commonly 
found in the literature: 40 and 60 percent of the median income in the 
Basque Country7.  
But in addition to different thresholds, poverty can also be defined in 
terms of different dimensions such as incidence, intensity, and 
inequality. For each of these dimensions, different indices are drawn up, 
and this paper computes each one to learn more about the impact of 
MIS on different dimensions of poverty.  
The results of the first part of the analysis show that MIS has a 
substantial impact in reducing poverty for the measures displayed. 
However, poverty is not completely eradicated, firstly because some 
poor people do not meet the requirements to be MIS beneficiaries; and 
secondly because sometimes the payments received are insufficient, 
particularly for some types of household, to bring them out of poverty 
given the standard poverty definitions commonly used in the literature.  
The second part of the analysis uses the conceptual framework and 
empirical model developed by Beckerman (1979), where concepts of 
effectiveness and efficiency are defined. Results show that in terms of 
effectiveness (i.e. the ability to eradicate poverty) the policy works 
properly. For MIS beneficiaries poverty, as defined in Basque legislation, 
is 98% eradicated. However, in terms of efficiency (i.e. avoiding wastage 
of resources) only 63% of the benefit transferred effectively contributes 
to poverty reduction. Furthermore, 13.4% of total transfers were 
received by non pre-poor people. These results suggest that there is 
                                           
7 For more details of different thresholds see European Commission, Research findings 
- Social Situation Monitor - Risk of poverty on basis of different thresholds 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1050&intPageId=1894&langId=en 
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still room for improvement in the distribution of MIS to recipients. A 
similar study has been conducted for the Guaranteed Minimum Income 
Program in Portugal (Rodrigues, 2001). The author analyzes the 
effectiveness and efficiency of this aid, approved in 1996, in terms of 
poverty reduction, using the same conceptual framework.  
In light of these results, the last section presents some policy 
recommendations. The poverty line established in the legislation of the 
Basque Country differs from those commonly found in the literature. 
The different criteria used to define these lines is key to understanding 
the weakness of the policy. I therefore suggest that attempts be made to 
achieve full effectiveness and efficiency, and present a new distribution 
of expenditure on MIS which seeks to maximize its coverage and its 
impact in reducing poverty. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews 
institutional aspects of MIS implemented in the Basque Country. Section 
3 gives describes the data. Section 4 defines poverty and its measures 
and presents the impact of the policy on reducing poverty. Section 5 
analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of MIS. Section 6 proposes 
some improvements to the policy. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and 
concludes. 
2.2. The Minimum Income Scheme in the 
Basque Country Region 
The Basque Minimum Income Scheme was introduced in 1989, with the 
so-called Integral Plan to Combat Poverty. Since then it has undergone 
several modifications. In 1998 it became a law. The quantity of benefits 
and the requisites for being a beneficiary have also been modified 
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several times. The latest version, on which this description is based, was 
implemented in 2011 (Act 4/2011)8. 
The first important aspect to note is that the Basque Minimum Income 
Scheme is household-based, i.e. the aid is transferred to family units 
rather than to individuals. To receive the aid, applicants must comply 
with the following eligibility requisites: first, they must show that their 
household income is insufficient to meet basic needs, which means 
inability to access the goods and services necessary for minimum 
welfare in society according to the Basque Government criterion of 
poverty detailed below. The second eligibility condition concerns 
residency in the Basque Country: In principle, the MIS recipient in the 
household must be registered on the census and actually have resided 
in the Basque Country for the last three years without interruption. If 
they can prove five years of paid work experience in the Basque Country, 
the residence requisite is reduced to one year instead of three. If none 
of the above requirements is met, recipients must have been registered 
for five continuous years out of the immediately preceding ten years. 
Moreover, both holders and other beneficiaries cohabiting in the same 
family unit who are able to work must commit to being available to do 
so and to actively searching for employment. 
The Minimum Income Scheme is also understood as a last resort 
scheme, and as such applicants must already have requested all other 
income aids to which they are entitled. In principle, the scheme is 
compatible with other income aids or wages earned by a family member 
as long as they do not exceed the threshold. In addition, applicants 
must not own any property other than their usual residence.  
                                           
8 The complete order can be found here: 
 https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2011-15732 
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Coverage: MIS is transferred to family units on a monthly basis. The 
amount set by the Basque Government to address basic needs varies 
depending on the minimum wage (MW), the number of people in the 
household, the number of pensioners and whether it is a single-parent 
household or not. Specifically, it is set at 88% of the MW for single-
member households and varies up to 125% of the MW for households 
with three or more members. In the case of households with at least one 
pensioner the percentages are increased to 100% and 135% respectively. 
Single-parent households receive an additional subsidy of €45. In line 
with these guidelines, the legislation distinguishes between eight types 
of housing unit, as shown in Table 2.1 along with the amount of MIS for 
each one in 2016. These amounts establish the first poverty line used in 
this paper9.  
Table 2.1. Poverty line by type of household in 2016.
 
 
If there are incomes other than wages in the household, MIS covers the 
shortfall up to these thresholds. In order to encourage recipients to 
find work, if there are wage incomes in the household the legislation 
implements the so-called “Stimulus to employment”. The latest version, 
implemented in 2001 (Order of 14 February 2001)10, establishes that a 
                                           
9  The MIS has a supplement called “Supplementary Housing Benefit”, which is a 
periodic financial benefit intended to cover the cost of renting a habitual residence for 
those households which are not owner-occupiers. 
10 The complete order can be found here: 
http://www.lanbide.euskadi.eus/contenidos/informacion/rgi_normativa/es_def/adjunt
os/Orden%2014-02-2001.pdf  
€
1 1#adult 626.58
2 2#adults 803.31
3 3#or#more#people,#at#least#2#adults 888.62
4 Single<parent#(1#child) 848.81
5 Single<parent#(2#or#more#children) 934.12
6 1#retired#people 710.89
7 2#adults,#at#least#1#retired 888.62
8 3#or#more#people,#at#least#1#retired 959.7
Type#of#household
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certain percentage of wages from self-employment or other jobs of the 
applicant or other members of the family unit will be excluded. The 
percentage of income from employment excluded is determined by the 
following formula: 
%	excluded =	= 	 88%MW	 ∗ 	eq. factor		– 	pov. line + 	0.1 ∗ total	wages	in	the	household	– 	pov. linetotal	wages	in	the	household 							 [2.1] 
The equivalence factor is 1.5 for single-member households and 1.8 for 
two-member households, with a further 0.1 being added for each 
additional member from 2 onwards, regardless of the type of 
household. The poverty line is as defined in Table 2.1 for each type of 
household. 88% of the Minimum Wage was €626.58 in 2016. 
Summarizing, the final MIS when there is wage income in the household 
is:  
MIS	payment = 	pov. line	–	(	1	–%	excluded	) ∗ total	wages	in	the	household			[2.2] 
These formulas are important in the calculations of the efficiency of MIS 
in Section 4 below, as the amount excluded must not be seen as a waste 
of resources but as an incentive to employment.  
2.3. Data Description 
To carry out this analysis I use the Survey of Poverty and Social 
Inequalities (EPDS its Spanish acronym) for the Basque Country. The 
latest available wave is for 2016. This sample includes 10,316 
individuals belonging to 4,327 households representative of the total 
population of the Basque Country. I use the weightings available to 
obtain population figures, which seem to coincide largely with official 
statistics.  
The EPDS includes information on the households surveyed and their 
members. It contains personal information such as gender, age, census 
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status, number of years registered (if registered in the Basque Country), 
nationality, education level and place of origin. It also contains labor 
market information: labor status, type of contract if employed, etc. The 
last part of the survey deals with the economic situation of households. 
There is information available on all types of income (and the members 
that receive them), spending, and savings in each household. This 
includes on the one hand wages, benefits, retirement pension, loans, 
revenues, transfers, heritage assets, social aids and, especially, the 
amount of Minimum Income Scheme received; and on the other hand 
rent payment, mortgage, monthly bills, lending, etc. Thus, all income 
information is presented on a monthly basis. Finally, the EPDS includes a 
weighting factor that enables the sample to be weighted to give 
population figures, so all calculations are weighted by that factor. The 
basic figures obtained are very similar to the official ones, which make 
its use very robust.  
With all this income information, the EPDS computes a monthly variable 
called Total Household Income, which is my first reference variable here. 
This income variable corresponds to the total income received by the 
different members and is equal to gross income including benefits 
minus taxes and minus insurance contributions, i.e. Total Household 
Income includes the amount of MIS paid11. I refer to this variable as 
(total) disposable income. The other variable of interest is the amount of 
MIS received by each household.  
Income information in the EPDS is reported by individuals. Moreover, 
one household member may answer for another if he/she is not present 
during the survey. The official registration of family income according to 
which the MIS is given is not the same. It is very common for this kind of 
reported data and the official data not to coincide exactly. On the one 
                                           
11 Detailed information on the calculation of Total Household Income can be found in 
the Annex. 
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hand, total disposable income in the dataset includes transfers from 
family and friends to the members of the household that the official 
statistics do not include. Nor are payments for informal work included in 
the official data, though they may appear in the reported data. 
Furthermore, total disposable income in the EPDS includes a monthly 
average amount apportioned for running one’s own company, for 
treasury refunds or for labor-related indemnities. Finally, the 
information is less precise when one individual in the household 
responds in regard to the income of others.  
It is also important to highlight that the database does not include all 
the information needed to determine whether a household complies 
with the requirements to be an MIS beneficiary. For instance, ownership 
of second homes and the number of years worked in the Basque 
Country are not reported. Therefore, my analysis assumes that every 
household that receives MIS complies with those requirements which I 
do not observe, and that every household that does not receive MIS in 
spite of falling short of the income threshold fails to comply with one or 
more of the remaining requirements or has not applied for it. To draw 
up a more in-depth analysis of the impact of MIS it would be important 
to have full information related to the requirements. 
In the empirical exercise, I simulate the scenario that reproduces 
household income in the absence of MIS. This enables me to compare 
this counterfactual situation with the real one and hence measure the 
impact of MIS on reducing poverty. The pre-benefit income situation is 
defined as the difference between disposable income and the amount of 
MIS received. Total disposable income in the sample is therefore the 
post-benefit income, as it already includes MIS.  This gives two 
scenarios: pre and post-MIS. Note that when the direct impact on 
poverty is measured the indirect effects of benefits are ignored. No 
account is taken of the financing of social security benefits –i.e. the 
extent to which the redistributed effect of benefits may be offset by 
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taxes and social security contributions, or the indirect effect of either 
these taxes or benefits on the size or the economic circumstances of the 
population that receive the benefits (Beckerman, 1979). Furthermore, I 
also assume that there is no change in the behavior of individuals in 
response to the introduction of the Minimum Income Scheme 
(Rodrigues, 2001). That is to say, the rate of exit into employment of 
individuals would be similar if they were not MIS recipients. In other 
words, poverty does not become chronic because of MIS, which is a 
common fear, given that the Minimum Income Scheme itself does not 
delay the probability of finding a job. This is one of the main 
conclusions reached in the third Chapter of the thesis. 
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of households in the Basque Country 
by type according to MIS provision. It also shows the incidence of 
individual and household MIS beneficiaries by type (%MIS). In all 124,481 
MIS beneficiaries in 59,936 households are found.  
Table 2.2. Distribution of individuals, households, and incidence of 
MIS beneficiaries by type 
 
 
According to Table 2.2, the most frequent type of household in the 
Basque Country comprises three or more people, including at least two 
adults (type 3). Almost half of all individuals live in households of this 
type, though less than one third of households are of this type. Focusing 
on the other dimension of the table, i.e. the incidence of MIS recipients, 
5.8% of the more than two million inhabitants of the Basque Country are 
MIS beneficiaries. However, the percentage of MIS recipients varies in 
line with the type of household where they reside. The type of 
Type Total) % %)MIS Total % %MIS
1 1)adult 146,994 6.86 15.07 146,994 16.78 15.07
2 2)adults 211,256 9.86 6.10 105,628 12.05 6.10
3 3)or)more)people,)at)least)2)adults 1,039,015 48.49 5.72 279,535 31.90 5.47
4 SingleBparent)(1)child) 17,947 0.84 34.63 8,974 1.02 34.63
5 SingleBparent)(2)or)more)children) 14,375 0.67 41.73 4,573 0.52 41.83
6 1)retired)people 103,809 4.85 6.66 103,809 11.85 6.66
7 2)adults,)at)least)1)retired 269,998 12.60 2.07 134,999 15.41 2.07
8 3)or)more)people,)at)least)1)retired 339143 15.83 1.56 91,741 10.47 1.48
Total 2,142,537 100.00 5.81 876,252 100.00 6.84
Individuals Households
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household with the highest incidence of MIS recipients is single-parent 
with two or more children (type 5) (42% receive MIS). By contrast only 
1.6% of households with three or more people, at least one of them 
retired (type 8) are MIS recipients.  
2.4. Assessing the Impact of MIS on Poverty 
Reduction 
In this section, I assess the extent to which MIS fulfills its main 
objective, which is to prevent people from living in poverty. To that end 
certain basic concepts such as poverty and how it is measured have to 
be defined.  
2.4.1. Basic Concepts 
2.4.1.1.		Definition	of	Poverty		
There has been much discussion in the literature on how to define the 
poverty line and there is no objective, scientific, “correct” definition of 
poverty (Beckerman, 1979). It is generally accepted that poor people are 
those who live below the poverty threshold, i.e. the income level that 
permits a certain minimum standard of living, given the conventional 
necessities of society at that point in time and other social objectives 
(Beckerman, 1979). This is known as the poverty line12. However, there 
are different definitions of the term.  
The legislation in the Basque Country establishes a limited payment for 
each type of family, i.e. eight thresholds, which is the maximum 
quantity of MIS assignable, as presented in Table 2.1. In this paper, the 
first definition of “poverty line” is marked by that maximum income for 
each family type.  
                                           
12 This paper uses the terms poverty “line”, “threshold” and “limit” as synonyms.  
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However, in the relevant literature the term “poverty” is frequently 
defined on the basis of a percentage of the median income. The most 
commonly used definition at present considers the “poor” in a given 
society to be those whose income is less than 60% of the median income 
of that society (Villar, 2017). Similarly, 40% of the median is defined as 
“extreme poverty”.  
The needs of a household grow with each additional member, but due to 
economies of scale in consumption that growth is not proportional. With 
the help of equivalence scales, the literature on poverty assigns a factor 
to each household which weights its needs depending on its size (OECD, 
2013). In this paper I use the OECD-modified equivalence scale, which is 
commonly used in the literature. It assigns a value of 1 to the first 
household member, 0.5 to each additional adult and 0.3 to each child 
under 14. I thus calculate what I call the equivalent (or individualized) 
income, dividing total disposable income in the household by its 
equivalence scale13. The figures taken as references are therefore the 
per capita income within the consumption unit (household adjusted 
according to size and composition). Once the equivalent income is 
calculated it is assigned to each member of the household. This assigns 
every member of the household the same equivalent income, so the 
whole household is be either poor or not14.  
Once the equivalent population income is known, the income 
distribution of the society and, therefore, the median can be calculated. 
For the Basque Country the 2016 figure is €1428, which means that 60% 
is €857 and 40% is €571. Note that the median income is the same 
before and after the MIS transfer because all beneficiaries are placed 
                                           
13 To a certain extent, equivalence scales are already taken into account in the Basque 
legislation when types of household and the corresponding amounts of MIS as defined, 
as presented in Table 2.1.  
14  Housing costs are not included by attributing income, as they are taken into 
account in the legislation via Supplementary Housing Benefit. 
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below it, so the poverty line remains constant before and after the MIS 
scenario.  
The analysis is now conducted for the three poverty limits defined: the 
one in the legislation of the Basque Country (BC), the standard definition 
in the literature of the extreme poverty line as 40% of the median 
(40%Me) and the standard poverty line in the literature of 60% of the 
median (60%Me). It is important to highlight that when I refer to the 
poverty lines in the literature, individualized disposable income is used. 
However, when I consider the Basque Country poverty line I apply the 
total disposable income of each household (as the legislation does). 
Hence, for the 40% and 60% poverty lines an individual is poor if his/her 
equivalent disposable income is less than €571 or €857, respectively. 
With the BC line an individual is poor if the total disposable income of 
his/her household is below the legislated limit for that specific type of 
household. This means that in all three lines either all individuals in the 
family unit are poor or none of them is. 
Comparing the Basque and Standard Poverty Lines 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to compare the BC 
poverty line with the standard lines in the literature. This will enable 
readers to understand the findings in subsequent sections better.  
As explained above, there are eight different types of household, each 
with its own poverty threshold. To compare them with the standard lines 
the eight equivalent poverty lines must be calculated using the 
equivalence scale, i.e. the amount of income shown in Table 2.1 must be 
converted into the equivalent individualized income using the OECD 
modified scale. For example, for a household with two adults the 
threshold is set at €803.31. The equivalence scale for such a household 
is 1.5 (1 + 0.5 for the second adult). Therefore, the equivalent poverty 
line for this type of household is €535.34 (€803.31/1.5). This figure is 
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37.5% of the median (535.31/1428), i.e. slightly below the extreme 
poverty line. 
However, the Basque Country and the OECD modified-scale use 
different criteria for weighting each member of the household. In the 
Basque Country being a single parent or a retired person is assumed to 
result in a higher cost of living, so the poverty limit is shifted upwards, 
but the OECD-modified scale does not consider these exceptional 
conditions as particular cases. On the other hand in the Basque Country 
the poverty line does not change for each additional member of a 
household up to three, but under the OECD criterion every additional 
member counts. For that reason, some types of household under the 
Basque definition can be made up of different numbers of members: For 
example, two adults with one child is Type 3 but two adults with two 
children or more is also Type 3. Moreover, the modified-scale varies in 
each situation.  
Figure 2.1 shows the ratio between the individualized BC poverty line 
and the median income in 2016 (€1428) per type of household. Given 
that some households do not consist of a single composition, several 
common variations are presented.  
The equivalent poverty line for most cases does not exceed 40% of the 
median. Five types exceed it: 1, 4, 6, 7 and 5 only if there are at most 
two children in the family. In addition, type 6 (one retired) stands at 
approximately 50% of the median. Moreover, the bigger the household 
is, the further it is from the 40% poverty line. This result was expected 
since the criteria used in Basque the legislation differs from that of the 
OECD scale. This figure suggests that the Basque Country poverty line 
seems to be set somewhat low, considering that never covers 60% of the 
median and hardly ever 40%.  
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Figure 2.1. Equivalent poverty line as a percentage of the median 
income (€1428) for some examples of each type of household
Note: Those households over 40% of the median are shown in green.  
 
Following this methodology and in line with the number and 
characteristics of the families that live in the Basque Country, Figure 2.2 
shows the equivalent poverty line as a percentage of median income for 
all MIS beneficiaries. The X- axis represents the percentage of the 
cumulative population, ranked from lowest to highest equivalent poverty 
line, i.e. individuals from large households are placed on the left while 
individuals from household type 6 are placed on the right. As shown in 
the figure above, this is the type that shows the highest equivalent 
poverty line, and therefore the highest ratio with respect to the median 
income. 
This figure shows that for 63% of MIS beneficiaries (78,647 individuals) 
the BC poverty line lies below the extreme poverty line (40%Me) shown 
in red. In addition, for approximately one third of MIS recipients the line 
set by the BC falls below 30% of the median income. As shown in Figure 
2.1, there is not a single case in which 50% is exceeded. The people 
above the red line - the remaining 37% - are those that live in 
households shown by green bars in Figure 2.1. Summarizing, in most 
cases the threshold set by the Basque Country is low compared to the 
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extreme poverty line defined in the literature. Having defined, compared 
and clarified the poverty lines, I now proceed to explain how to measure 
them in a given society.  
Figure 2.2. Equivalent poverty line as a percentage of the median 
income for MIS recipients in the Basque Country
 
 
2.4.1.2.	Measuring	Poverty	
The concept of poverty has different dimensions and can hence be 
measured in a number of ways. Each dimension of poverty is normally 
captured by a different index. In the empirical section below I compute 
each index before and after MIS in order to measure the impact of the 
policy on poverty reduction for each dimension.  
There is an extensive literature on poverty indexes (see Chakravarty 
2009, Villar 2017 for a discussion). Each index emphasizes some aspect 
of the poverty problem. It is customary to assume that poverty 
measurement involves a direct or indirect appraisal of the three different 
aspects, known as Sen’s three I’s of poverty (Sen 1976): Incidence, 
Intensity and Inequality. Here I approach the measuring of poverty by 
resorting to the FGT family of poverty indexes (see Foster, Greer and 
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Thorbecke, 1984). This is one of the most widely used poverty indices 
due to its intuitive nature, its decomposability properties, and the 
possibility of modulating concern for poverty by adjusting poverty 
aversion by a single parameter. Once the poverty line is defined, I 
determine the set of poor agents, i = 1, 2,…,q.  For each of those 
agents I calculate the relative distance from the poverty threshold, (z – 
yi)/z. This value can be enhanced or reduced by simply using a power on 
this fraction. The larger the power, the larger the impact on poverty of 
each individual observation. The overall assessment of poverty derives 
from adding up all the individual measurements and dividing the 
resulting figure by the population size, n. That is,  
𝐹𝐺𝑇g(𝑦, 𝑧) = 	 1𝑛 1 − 𝑦#𝑧 g 																																																	[2.3]l#mn  
The parameter α  determines the impact on individual deviations of the 
poverty line, increasing them for α >1  and decreasing them otherwise. I 
denote the population size by n, the number of poor people by q, the 
income distribution vector by y, and the poverty threshold by z. This 
notation is maintained below. 
This poverty index satisfies all standard requirements: scale 
independence, anonymity, focus, etc. (see Chakravarty 2009, ch. 2 for a 
detailed discussion).   
Interestingly enough, some particular values of the parameter 𝛼  yield 
simple, familiar formulas.  The case of 𝛼 = 0  resolves into the well-
known, elementary measure known as the head-count ratio. This is the 
conventional measure of the incidence of poverty, and it reveals the 
proportion of poor people in society as a fraction of the total 
population. That is: 
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𝐹𝐺𝑇o(𝑦, 𝑧) = 1𝑛 1 =		l#mn 	𝑞𝑛																																																							[2.4] 
Looking at the head-count ratio before and after the transfer of MIS it is 
possible to learn how far the percentage of poor people decreases 
thanks to the income scheme. The biggest advantage of this relative 
index is its simplicity. However, this index does not contain information 
on the situation of the poor, only on their weight relative to the total 
population. 
The case of 𝛼 = 1 is also very interesting because it provides a combined 
measure of both the incidence and intensity of poverty. It is given by:  
𝐹𝐺𝑇n(𝑦, 𝑧) = 	 1𝑛 1 − 𝑦#𝑧 																																																[2.5𝑎]l#mn  
This expression can be rewritten as: 
FGT1 y, z( ) =
q
n ×
1
q 1−
yi
z
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟i=1
q∑⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ =
q
n ×
z − yi( )i=1
q∑
qz
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
               [2.5b]  
which says that FGT1 can be expressed as the product two different 
terms: The incidence (head-count ratio) and the intensity of poverty, 
measured by the average relative distance from the poverty line, which 
informs about how poor  the poor are on average. This is important 
because the mere fact that people are below the poverty line conveys no 
information about how far away from it they are. Note that the term 𝑧 −	𝑦#l#mn , is the so-called poverty gap index (PGI), which captures the 
distance (in Euros) between the income of the poor and the poverty line. 
It measures the amount in Euros required to eradicate poverty in the 
society under analysis. Dividing this amount by the product of the total 
poor population and the poverty line, the conventional relative intensity 
measure is obtained. This measure reflects how far the average poor 
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individual is from the poverty line, relative to its level (i.e. the gap as a 
percentage). By focusing on that index before and after MIS, it is 
obtained information on the intensity of poverty through the situation of 
the average poor individual in each scenario.  
The case of 𝛼 = 2 is usually interpreted as a measure of the intensity of 
poverty. This index is proportional to the squared sum of the income 
shortfalls of the poor. 
𝐹𝐺𝑇s 𝑦, 𝑧 	= 	 1𝑛𝑧s 𝑧 − 𝑦# sl#mn 																																																						[2.6] 
Squaring the income shortfalls gives them progressively greater 
weighting, thus expressing a much higher concern for poverty (and, 
indirectly, making inequality worse among the poor) 15 . Deprivation 
depends on the distance between the actual income of the poor and the 
poverty limit: the further they are from the poverty threshold, the higher 
their weight in the index. Given an income distribution and a poverty 
line, this index will produce an assessment of poverty that is much 
higher than that derived from equation [2.5]. And, by the same token, it 
will prove much more sensitive to any transfer policy, thus making the 
outcome much better. This aspect is worth bearing in mind.   
One of the most appealing properties of the FGT indexes is that they are 
additively decomposable according to population subgroups, using the 
following formula: 
𝐹𝐺𝑇g 𝑦, 𝑧 = 	 𝑛u𝑛vumn 𝐹𝐺𝑇g 𝑦 u , 𝑧 u 																																										[2.7] 
                                           
15 A more in-depth analysis of the impact of MIS on inequality in the Basque Country 
is conducted by De la Rica, Gorjón & Revenga (forthcoming).  
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such that income vector y breaks down into subgroups of income 
vectors 𝑦(n) ,… , 𝑦(v)  and 𝑧(u)  is the poverty line of the corresponding 
subgroup16. m is 8 in our analysis (the number of types of household). 
The population share weights ( xyx 	) are those presented in Table 2.2. 
The decomposability property is important when the population is made 
up of heterogeneous agents. Several poverty studies have demonstrated 
the usefulness of breaking down populations into subgroups. Given that 
MIS is based on household types, decomposing these indexes by 
household types is useful, as it enables the relative incidence of each 
type of household in total poverty to be determined by measuring 
poverty in any of the ways defined above. Thus, it reveals how the 
contribution of each type of household to total poverty changes with the 
application of MIS.  
The next subsection assesses the extent to which MIS affects poverty in 
the Basque Country for the poverty thresholds and indexes presented.  
2.4.2 Empirical Results - Impact of MIS on poverty 
reduction 
The relative poverty indicators for the Sen’s three I’s are shown in Table 
2.3. To measure the impact of the application of MIS, the indicators are 
presented before and after the transfer, thus enabling the two scenarios 
to be compared. Furthermore, a third column is added that computes 
the percentage of variation of each index due to MIS. This enables me to 
compare the relative changes in all dimensions of poverty. The results 
are presented using the three different poverty lines defined above: 40% 
and 60% of the median income (€571 and €857, respectively) and the 
Basque Country line (BC). For this last case I compute the indexes by 
using both individual units and household units. Using individual units 
                                           
16 Note that 𝑧(u)	changes for each type of household when the BC poverty line is used 
but remains constant with the standard poverty thresholds. 
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facilitates direct comparison with the standard poverty lines and 
household size is explicitly taken into account. But results are also 
displayed at household level as this is the unit specified in the 
legislation of the Basque Country and the approach of the policy aimed 
at eradicating poverty.  
Table 2.3. Head-count ratio, Relative Average Distance, Poverty-Gap 
ratio and FGT2 index, before and after the MIS transference and 
the relative fall in absolute value (%)17. 
 
 
Incidence: Lines 1 to 4 present the result of applying formula [2.4] 
before and after MIS. According to the Basque Country poverty 
threshold, the incidence of poverty is reduced to less than 3% of 
individuals (and 4% of households). Hence, the aid reduces poverty 
                                           
17 Note that the poverty threshold under the BC line differs for each type of household 
type. In consequence, the average distance is calculated for each poor 
individual/household to their corresponding poverty line. The RAD divides the previous 
amount by the weighted average poverty lines for those poor individuals/households. 
In the same way, the denominator of the PGR is a weighted sum of the minimum 
income required to avoid poverty for each type of family unit. PGR can be also 
calculated as the product of the head-count ratio and the RAD. For the BC poverty line 
the figures do not coincide, as there is not a unique threshold. Finally, the FGT index is 
also a weighted sum of each type of household. 
Before After %)change
Poverty)line Units
40%)Me Individuals 7.83 4.88 37.70
60%)Me Individuals 17.41 16.34 6.16
BC Individuals 6.50 2.73 57.99
BC Households 8.44 3.92 53.55
40%)Me Individuals 49.01 24.93 49.13
60%)Me Individuals 38.39 26.16 31.85
BC Individuals 49.67 25.09 49.48
BC Households 48.82 26.31 46.10
40%)Me Individuals 3.84 1.22 68.33
60%)Me Individuals 6.68 4.27 36.01
BC Individuals 3.08 0.65 78.89
BC Households 3.85 0.97 74.81
40%)Me Individuals 2.73 0.58 78.65
60%)Me Individuals 4.13 1.75 57.53
BC Individuals 2.39 0.41 82.91
BC Households 3.16 0.69 78.12
Intensity)(RAD)
Incidence)and)Intensity))(PGR)
Inequality))(FGT2)
Incidence)))(HeadOcount)ratio)
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substantially but does not fully eradicate it. This is partly because some 
poor households do not meet the requirements for receiving MIS and 
also because the amount received is not enough to take them out of 
poverty. In particular, it is observed that 18.5% of them are MIS 
recipients. 
The next question is how far MIS reduces poverty if the 40% ME 
threshold is considered instead of instead of the BC threshold. The first 
line of Table 2.3 gives the answer: Using this threshold the percentage 
of pre-MIS poor individuals is 8% of the population, and MIS reduces it 
to 5%. 34.6% of them are MIS recipients18. 
An analysis of the impact of MIS on eradicating poverty using the 60%ME 
threshold reveals that it hardly reduces it at all, which is expected given 
the comparative analysis between lines discussed above.  
Intensity: lines 5-8 in Table 2.3 seek to measure how poor the poor are 
by calculating the RAD. These figures represent how far the average 
poor individual is from his/her corresponding poverty line. It can be 
seen that MIS notably reduces the intensity of poverty for all three 
poverty definitions. The results for 40%Me and the BC are quite similar, 
while the result for the 60%Me differs. For the 40%Me and BC lines, 
before the application of MIS the average poor individual is 
approximately in the middle of the poverty limit. However, after MIS the 
average poor person is located one-fourth of the way to the line, which 
reflects a drop of 50% in the intensity of poverty after MIS19. 
                                           
18 By comparing the percentage of poor individuals after MIS under the 40%Me and BC 
line, I find that more than 2% of the Basque population (46,000 individuals) is not 
considered as poor under the Basque criterion but is considered so under the extreme 
poverty line.  
 
19 However, it must be taken into account that only poor people are included in this 
calculation so those who exit poverty as a result of the transfer are not counted in 
intensity calculations after MIS. For that reason, it is interesting to distinguish whether 
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Incidence and intensity: Lines 9-12 in Table 2.3 show the poverty gap 
ratio (PGR) before and after the transfer of MIS using formula [2.5], 
which is a combination of the two previous dimensions. As explained 
above, it represents the proportion of the total amount required to 
eradicate poverty that is still needed in terms of the minimum amount 
for eliminating poverty in the whole society.  
It can be seen that MIS notably reduces the figure for all three lines. For 
the BC and 40%Me, the remaining amount required is around 1% of the 
minimum income for avoiding poverty. Before the transfer, the poverty 
gap ratio is 3%-4%. Therefore, MIS brings society closer to putting an 
end to poverty.  
Focusing on the PGR as a combination of incidence and intensity, it can 
be seen that for the 40%Me line the fall in the PGR is predominantly 
driven by a fall in the intensity of poverty, whereas for the BC line the 
opposite is true.   
Inequality: Finally, the last four lines in Table 2.3 show the FGT2 index 
(formula [2.6]) as a poverty aversion indicator. This sensitive index 
shows that MIS is a very pro-poor policy because it results in substantial 
drops in all three thresholds. In other words, the poverty of the poorest 
is greatly reduced.  
As a first conclusion, it is noteworthy that the greater the degree of 
poverty aversion ( 𝛼 ) shown by the indicators is, the higher the 
percentage drop resulting from MIS. It can therefore be asserted that 
MIS works well in helping those who are far below the poverty line. 
                                                                                                                            
the RAD drops because MIS reduces the intensity of poverty but still leaves them poor 
or because it raises people out of poverty and non-recipients are less severely poor. In 
particular, around 2/3 of the 18.5% who remain poor as MIS recipients are less than 
€50 from the poverty line. 
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In light of these results, and using the information presented in Figures 
2.1 and 2.2, it can be concluded that the standard poverty line in the 
literature (60%ME) is very far from the BC line. Hence, from now on the 
paper focuses only on the BC and 40%ME poverty thresholds. Moreover, 
it seems reasonable for MIS to seek to reduce extreme poverty. 
In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the impact of MIS on 
poverty, I take advantage of the properties of the indexes presented to 
decompose them into subgroups, specifically by types of household. 
This reveals in which type of household poverty is most severe.  
Decomposition	of	poverty	indexes	by	types	of	household	
This section presents the 𝐹𝐺𝑇o  head-count ratio (𝛼 = 0) and the 𝐹𝐺𝑇n 
poverty-gap ratio ( 𝛼 = 1 ) for each type of household and their 
contribution (in %) to total poverty before and after MIS for each index. 
This reveals where most attention should be focused for a more 
successful eradication of poverty, It also reveals how the contribution of 
each type of household to the total poverty changes with the application 
of MIS. 
All results corresponding to the head-count and poverty-gap ratios are 
presented before and after the transfer of MIS, applying formula [2.7] 
for the BC poverty line in Table 2.4, and for the 40%Me line in Table 
2.520. Calculations at household level for the BC line are not displayed 
because the information is deemed to be of little interest, given that it is 
especially important in them to include household size. Nor are they 
                                           
20 Relative Average Distance is not considered as it only includes poor people, mainly 
non-MIS recipients, in the calculation. Nor is the decomposition FGT2 index presented 
for sampling reasons. The results might be not robust because certain households, 
specifically single-parent households, have few observations in the sample and a high 
incidence among MIS beneficiaries. Therefore, any small variation could affect the 
results drastically, especially if the households in question are far away from the 
poverty line, as the index varies exponentially. 
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comparable with the standard poverty lines in the literature. The units 
are therefore individuals in both tables. 
At first sight, the weighted sum of the head-count and poverty-gap 
ratios coincides with the figure shown in Table 2.3, so the additively 
decomposable condition is satisfied. Moreover, the MIS notably reduces 
all three indexes for all types of household and poverty lines but the 
results are heterogeneous.  
Table 2.4. Decomposition of the Poverty Indices by type of household 
and its weight using the BC Poverty line, before and after the MIS. 
 
 
Table 2.4 shows the impact of MIS on poverty, focusing on the BC 
poverty line. Incidence (head-count ratio) and intensity (poverty-gap 
ratio) are reduced mainly for single-parent and one-adult households. 
However, 17.7% of households comprising single-parents with one child 
are still poor even after the transfer. As mentioned above, most of those 
who remain poor after the MIS transfer are likely to be people who do 
not meet the requirements.  
Contributions to total poverty are distributed over many types of 
household. In terms of contribution to incidence, the households that 
stand out most are those of type 3, and to a slightly lesser extent types 
1 and 7. With respect to intensity, the stand-out households are types 1, 
3 and 2.  
Focusing on the 40% median poverty line (Table 2.5), a big fall in the 
incidence (head-count ratio) and intensity (PGR) of poverty can be seen 
Before After Before After Before After Before After
1	adult 20.96 8.59 22.0 21.6 12.67 3.57 26.3 33.8
2	adults 7.70 3.66 11.6 13.2 3.46 1.18 10.3 16.1
3	or	more	people,	at	least	2	adults 5.47 1.59 40.7 28.2 3.12 0.42 45.8 28.2
Single-parent	(1	child) 45.02 17.67 5.8 5.4 25.21 3.67 6.4 4.2
Single-parent	(2	or	more	children) 40.49 7.64 4.2 1.9 23.42 4.78 4.8 4.4
1	retired	people 7.87 5.66 5.8 10.0 2.20 0.79 3.2 5.3
2	adults,	at	least	1	retired 4.40 3.88 8.5 17.9 0.79 0.44 3.0 7.7
3	or	more	people,	at	least	1	retired 0.55 0.32 1.3 1.9 0.06 0.01 0.3 0.2
Total 6.50 2.73 100.00 100.00 3.08 0.65 100.00 100.00
FGT0 FGT1
Headcount	ratio	(%) Weight	(%) PGR	(%) Weight	(%)
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for single-parent households and households with one adult. The 
impact is substantial because the transfer that they receive is around the 
40% Me line, as shown in Figure 2.1. In spite of the substantial 
reduction, these three types of household are still the ones furthest 
away from putting and end to poverty.  
Table 2.5. Decomposition of the Poverty Indices by type of household 
and its weight using the 40%Me Poverty line, before and after the MIS. 
 
 
If we now focus on contributions to total poverty under these two 
different definitions, there is one type of household that clearly 
contributes more both before and after MIS: that formed by three or 
more persons, with at least two adults (type 3). The table shows that if 
poverty among this group were eradicated, in head-count terms 2/3 of 
total poverty would be eliminated.  
In summary, it can be concluded that in terms of incidence the Basque 
MIS notably reduces the number of poor individuals and households. It 
also reduces the intensity of the poverty substantially: after MIS Basque 
society is notably closer to eradicating poverty altogether; in other 
words, the extra amount in Euros required to put an end to poverty is 
much lower. Furthermore, in terms of inequality the MIS proves to be a 
very pro-poor policy, as it alleviates the situation of the poorest 
individuals.  By type of household, single-parent family units are the 
poorest but their contribution to total poverty is low because they are 
few in number and the amount of money that they receive exceeds the 
40% Me line in most cases. By contrast, households with three or more 
members and at least two adults are not so poor but they are much 
Before After Before After Before After Before After
1	adult 19.02 6.54 16.7 9.2 12.19 3.18 21.8 17.9
2	adults 8.38 4.37 10.5 8.8 3.73 1.35 9.6 10.9
3	or	more	people,	at	least	2	adults 8.48 6.52 52.5 64.8 4.21 1.41 53.3 56.1
Single-parent	(1	child) 40.99 9.69 4.4 1.7 22.66 2.44 4.9 1.7
Single-parent	(2	or	more	children) 44.67 9.37 3.8 1.3 23.40 4.86 4.1 2.7
1	retired	people 3.88 1.02 2.4 1.0 1.57 0.52 2.0 2.1
2	adults,	at	least	1	retired 2.70 2.18 4.4 5.6 0.68 0.35 2.2 3.6
3	or	more	people,	at	least	1	retired 2.61 2.34 5.3 7.6 0.51 0.39 2.1 5.1
Total 7.83 4.88 100.00 100.00 3.84 1.22 100.00 100.00
FGT0 FGT1
Headcount	ratio	(%) Weight	(%) PGR	(%) Weight	(%)
81 
 
more numerous and they do not receive enough MIS, so their 
contribution to total extreme poverty is the highest.   
2.5. Effectiveness and Efficiency of the MIS 
This section seeks to measure the effectiveness21 and efficiency of MIS 
in eradicating poverty. The question I try to answer here is whether MIS 
is allocated properly (according to the legislation) or whether the same 
amount distributed in a different way would reduce poverty more. It is 
essential to address this question in order to make the best use of 
public funding. 
First of all, it is important to define both concepts. Effectiveness is 
understood as the ability to achieve a desired effect - eradication of 
poverty in this case. Efficiency is the ability to achieve that effect with 
the minimum cost, i.e. efficiency takes into account the "excess of 
resources" devoted to transfers delivered to the non-poor population. 
In general, social benefits reduce the poverty gap depending on the total 
amount spent and the efficiency of its use. Effectiveness depends on the 
objectives. For example, if the goal is to minimize extreme poverty then 
spending should be concentrated on the poorest, i.e. those who have 
the largest poverty gap. If the aim is to maximize the number of people 
raised above the poverty line then it should be concentrated on the least 
poor. Finally, if the objective is to maximize the number of target 
groups who receive the benefit then it should be spread over as large a 
proportion of the poor population as possible (Beckerman, 1979). 
Theoretically, the aim of the MIS in the Basque Country is to eradicate 
poverty for all those who meet the requirements, independently of how 
large their poverty gap is. 
                                           
21 Effectiveness could be understood as bringing to zero all the measures presented in 
Section 4. However, this section presents a new model that measures effectiveness as 
the proportion in Euros by which poverty has been reduced. 
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To measure the efficiency and effectiveness of MIS it is therefore 
necessary to focus on the criterion of poverty set out in the scheme 
itself, as that is the one that it seeks to eradicate. Therefore, unlike the 
previous section, the analysis here focuses only on the BC poverty line. 
Moreover, the unit of measurement used is households, which is the 
reference unit in the BC legislation. I also limit this analysis to MIS 
beneficiary households, disregarding the 47,708 poor individuals who 
are not MIS beneficiaries. I assume that they do not meet the requisites, 
and are therefore not a target group.  
The tool known as Beckerman’s Model is used to conduct the analysis of 
efficiency and effectiveness of MIS.  
2.5.1. Beckerman’s Model  
The concept of poverty reduction efficiency was developed by 
Beckerman (1979). Efficiency is defined in a manner that takes into 
account total expenditures as well as their impact on poverty gaps.  
Figure 2.3. Beckerman diagram 
 
The horizontal axis represents individuals ranked in increasing order of 
disposable income (poorest on the left) and the vertical axis represents 
their income. The diagonal lines represent the pre-MIS income and the 
post-MIS income of the population. The horizontal line is the poverty 
threshold.  
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Area C can be interpreted as total amount of MIS received by pre-MIS 
non-poor considered as “badly distributed”. This amount of money is 
transferred inefficiently because it neither takes people out of poverty 
nor reduces the poverty gap. Area B is the excess amount of benefits 
received by the pre-poor, i.e. the difference between the amount of 
benefits received by the poor and the amount by which their poverty 
gap is reduced. If the sole objective of the MIS is to reduce poverty 
(which is not, as it tries to incentivize exits into employment too) the 
spillover could be considered as “excess” payment. Area D represents 
the extra income that post-poor households need to get out of poverty.  
Area A can be interpreted as the total amount of MIS received by pre-
MIS poor considered as “well distributed”, i.e. that effectively reduces 
the poverty gap. Finally, the amount of benefits needed to eradicate 
poverty can be obtained from the areas D-B-C. Therefore, from an 
optimal point of view in terms of effectiveness and efficiency in 
eradicating poverty, areas D, B and C should be zero. 
Summarizing, the areas correspond to the following figures:  
 
A+B+C = total expenditure on MIS.  
A + B = total amount of benefits received by pre-MIS poor. 
A + D = pre-MIS poverty gap 
D = post-MIS poverty gap.  
 
Beckerman presents one effectiveness and two efficiency measurements: 
Overall poverty reduction effectiveness (OPRE): The proportion of the 
pre-benefit poverty gap reduced by transfers. 
𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸 = 	 𝐴𝐴 + 𝐷 
 
Therefore, OPRE is 100% when D = 0 
Vertical expenditure efficiency (VEE): The proportion of benefits 
accruing to people who would have been poor in the absence of 
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benefits, i.e. proportion of total transfers received by those individuals 
that were poor before the program. 
𝑉𝐸𝐸 = 	 𝐴 + 𝐵𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 
 
 
Poverty reduction efficiency (PRE): The net extent to which benefits 
reduce poverty. That is to say, the proportion of transfers that 
effectively contributes to a reduction in poverty, expressed by the 
poverty gap. Note that only the A amount contributes to reducing the 
pre-transfer poverty gap. 
𝑃𝑅𝐸 = 	 𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 
 
Therefore, the PRE is 100% when B+C = 0. 
These concepts of efficiency take into account the “waste of resources” 
associated with the transfers made to the non-pre-poor population and 
the excess payment to the non-post-poor population22.  
Stimulus to employment 
One aspect of the legislation with regard to the amount of MIS which 
must be taken into account when assessing efficiency is the incentives 
for the beneficiaries to find a job, i.e. the so-called “stimulus to 
employment”. These incentives are established in order not to 
discourage MIS recipients from looking for a job. If there are wage 
incomes in the household (and the total disposable income does not 
exceed the poverty line), a certain percentage is excluded when the 
                                           
22 It should be noted that a high level of efficiency of the program does not imply that 
poverty is greatly reduced (for example, when the amount of money transferred is 
low); nor does a low level of efficiency imply that there has been an insignificant 
reduction in poverty (giving more than required to poor individuals). Efficiency explains 
why the program has had a certain impact given the amount of money spent 
(Rodriguez, 1997). 
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corresponding MIS transfer is calculated. The dataset does not include a 
variable that indicates which part of the MIS corresponds to the stimulus 
to employment. However, know whether there are wage incomes in each 
household and what their amount is. Therefore, following equation 
[2.1], it is possible to calculate the amount of the stimulus to 
employment that corresponds to each household.  
In Beckerman’s diagram the post-benefit line does not include the 
stimulus to employment calculated for households with wage incomes, 
for the sake of clarity of exposition. Thus, only the fraction of the MIS 
that is intended to eradicate poverty (and not that which is to accelerate 
job finding) is represented, in line with the purpose of the diagram.  
When calculating efficiency measures, stimulus to employment must be 
also taken into account, as it cannot be interpreted as an overpayment. 
Given that it is not possible to distinguish which part of the MIS 
corresponds to such stimulus and which to the legal amount of MIS to 
be received by the household, I proceed as follows:   
- Area C includes all MIS transfers received by non-pre-poor 
households, regardless of whether they correspond to the stimulus to 
employment or not, as such households should not receive any payment 
because they are not poor.  
- Areas A and D reflect the poverty gaps. Stimuli to employment are not 
supposed to affect them since they should be interpreted as an extra 
payment beyond the poverty line. Area A might include some stimulus 
to employment but it is not possible to distinguish whether the lack of 
measurement comes from the incentives or from the legal amount of 
MIS that each household should obtain. Therefore, stimulus to 
employment does not affect the effectiveness of the policy. 
- Area B (the excess amount of benefits received by the pre-poor) is the 
one affected by the stimulus to employment, as it cannot be interpreted 
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as an overpayment. In order to take the stimulus into account, area B is 
re-calculated as follows: for pre-poor households with wage incomes 
the poverty line is shifted upwards according to formula [2.2]. The new 
poverty line for these households is the previous one plus the stimulus 
to employment that theoretically corresponds to them given the wages 
earned. Therefore, only the MIS amount that exceeds this re-calculated 
poverty line is taken as an overpayment, which compounds Area B.  
2.5.2. Empirical Results – Effectiveness and Efficiency 
of the MIS 
This section shows the results obtained from Beckerman’s model. First, 
some introductory figures are shown; then Beckerman’s diagrams are 
given, and finally the measures of effectiveness and efficiency calculated 
are presented. 
In total, we find 14,456 beneficiary households with 32,491 individuals 
who are not poor in the absence of MIS, which represents 26% of all MIS 
beneficiaries. The stimulus to employment calculated is €1,176,938, 
corresponding to 16,240 households with employed individuals 
(approximately 27%).  
Beckerman’s diagrams should be used with caution. The legislation 
presents eight different poverty lines, one for each type of household, 
so a different figure is required for each type. They are all presented in 
Figure 2.4. As explained, only households that receive MIS are shown. 
They are sorted from the poorest (left) to the richest (right). The green 
line represents pre-benefit disposable income and the orange line post-
benefit disposable income. To make the diagrams clearer, stimuli to 
employment are deducted from the post-disposable income line for 
those households with wage incomes, as indicated. Notice that the 
ordering of the households can change from one line to another, i.e. the 
poorest households before the MIS transfer might be not the same ones 
which are the poorest afterwards. 
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At first sight, it can be seen that MIS almost eradicates poverty (under 
BC criteria and for MIS recipients) as the orange line is only below the 
poverty line in a very few cases. In other words, the post-poverty gap 
(Area D) is very small in most cases. Hence, most poor households that 
meet the requisites for MIS are lifted out of poverty. This is reflected in 
the effectiveness measure. Notice that the post-benefit poor households 
represented by the segment of the orange line below the poverty line 
are those described in the previous section. The second noteworthy fact 
shown by these figures is that the area between the poverty line and the 
orange lines (B and C) is often large, even after stimuli to employment 
are discounted. Specifically, all the households whose pre-MIS 
disposable income (green line) is above the poverty line are households 
which were not pre-poor. This brings to light the scale of the waste of 
resources, which must be reflected in the efficiency indexes. 
The final step is to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness. Table 2.6 
presents these measurements by type of household and Table 2.7 
displays them for MIS beneficiaries all together.  
Table 2.6 shows that effectiveness (OPRE) is high for all household 
types: the lowest is that of type 7 (2 adults, at least 1 retired) where 94% 
of poverty is eradicated among MIS recipients. However, efficiency is not 
so high, as already anticipated by the figures. Household 8 is the stand-
out case: only 22% of the households that receive MIS were poor before 
the transfer and only 12% of the money invested in this type of 
household actually helps to reduce poverty. In terms of the number of 
each type of household, those which on which most resources are 
wasted are type 1 followed by type 3, as shown in the last column, 
mainly because only around 2/3 of the payments go directly to reducing 
poverty.  
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Figure 2.4. Beckerman’s diagram by type of household. 
Stimuli to employment are deducted in post-MIS line 
1 adult 
 
3 or more people (at least two adults) 
 
Single-parent (2 or more children) 
 
2 retired people 
 
 
2 adults 
 
Single-parent (1 child) 
 
1 retired people 
 
 
3 or more retired people 
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 Table 2.6. Beckerman measures of effectiveness and efficiency by 
type of household. 
 
 
To assess MIS as a whole, the table 2.7 shows efficiency and 
effectiveness for all MIS recipients together.  
Table 2.7. Measures of efficiency of the Beckerman’s diagram
 
 
 
Table 2.7 reveals that the Basque Country is very close to eradicating 
poverty for its definition of the term. The effectiveness in the 
eradication of poverty under the BC criteria for those households that 
meet the requisites for MIS is 98.3% (OPRE). The table also shows that 
86.55% of total transfers were received by pre-poor people (VEE). 
Therefore, 13.45% of total transfers were given to non pre-poor people. 
Moreover, 37% (100-63) of the amount of MIS is not actually used to 
eliminate poverty and, in terms of efficiency, represents a “waste of 
resources”. These figures are in part expected in view of the figures 
given above. Finally, the last column of Table 2.7 shows the amount of 
money necessary to eradicate poverty with 100% efficiency and 
effectiveness: the MIS budget used exceeds the amount required to put 
an ends to poverty by approximately €12 million each month. 
This raises the question of the reasons for these ineffectiveness 
findings. The first obvious candidate is that our dataset comes from 
reported income figures by the individuals interviewed, whereas MIS is 
OPRE VEE PRE
Eradicate-
poverty
1 1-adult 98.52% 94.79% 65.99% >4 302 861-€
2 2-adults 99.35% 73.52% 53.25% >1 686 180-€
3 3-or-more-people,-at-least-2-adults 98.63% 84.37% 63.55% >3 602 027-€
4 Single>parent-(1-child) 97.37% 99.54% 76.67% >454 740-€
5 Single>parent-(2-or-more-children) 98.11% 93.99% 65.79% >403 338-€
6 1-retired-people 95.41% 82.14% 67.63% >449 274-€
7 2-adult,-at-least-1-retired 94.33% 48.03% 41.52% >552 622-€
8 3-or-more-people,-at-least-1-retired 95.65% 22.37% 11.82% >413 384-€
Household-type
Overall poverty reduction effectiveness 98.27%
Vertical expenditure efficiency 86.55%
Poverty reduction efficiency 63.11%
Euros to eradicate poverty +11 864 426.€
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assigned using official registered income. It may be that that these two 
sources of information on income do not coincide, as explained in the 
data section. There may also be some lack of supervision of MIS 
recipients. If information on MIS households is not updated very 
frequently, some households may continue to receive transfers even 
after changes in their labor market situation should exclude them from 
MIS transfers.  
In conclusion, in terms of effectiveness, poverty as defined in the 
Basque Country is close to being eradicated for MIS recipients. However, 
there is room for improvement in terms of efficiency. In fact, more 
money is spent than should be needed to eradicate poverty under the 
BC definition. In other words, with the same cost the BC poverty line 
could be brought closer to the standard extreme poverty line used in 
the literature, especially for those that are furthest away from the line.  
In light of the results of the analyses conducted here, the next section 
provides some policy recommendations on MIS provision. 
2.6. Proposals to improve the Basque Minimum 
Income Scheme    
Results so far have revealed certain strengths and weaknesses of the 
Minimum Income Scheme to eradicate poverty in the Basque Country. 
This section now seeks to propose changes in its design so as to 
enhance its fairness and efficiency.  
The first design change proposed refers to the way that each household 
member is computed in defining poverty thresholds. Figure 2.2 shows 
that the as currently defined the BC poverty line means that 63% of MIS 
recipients are classed as being in extreme poverty (below 40% of the 
median income distribution), and that they are mostly persons who live 
in large households. These households are classed as being in extreme 
poverty because BC legislation does not compute each extra member 
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but instead the transfer remains constant from a particular number 
upwards. Hence, I propose that household members be counted 
following the OECD criterion, i.e using the OECD equivalent-modified 
scale. This assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, 0.5 to 
each additional adult and 0.3 to each child under 14. This is because the 
needs of a household grow with each additional member but economies 
of scale in consumption mean that the growth is not proportional23. In 
addition, this change is very likely to bring down the number of MIS-
receiving households because as the legislation now stands individuals 
from large families have incentives to live in separate households in 
order to receive a different MIS. Larger total amounts of MIS for large 
households would be offset by savings due to economies of scale with 
people living in the same household. The incentive to move out is thus 
reduced and individuals would tend to stay in the same household and 
make use of economies of scale, which would help bring down spending 
on MIS24. Moreover, this proposal encourages an increase in the birth 
rate as it does not penalize having more children.  
Secondly, there is a need to improve other inefficiencies detected in the 
current mechanism: it must be assured that MIS is not transferred to 
non-poor people, or in other words that ONLY poor people receive the 
transfer. In terms of the Beckerman model, this means eliminating area 
C. Moreover, the system should transfer to poor people only the 
payment required to raise them to the poverty line and no more. This 
means eliminating area B. Finally, effectiveness would improve if the 
new mechanism proposed enabled all MIS recipients to reach the 
poverty line, i.e. to exit poverty.  
                                           
23  Some steps in this direction are being taken. A new proposal that takes into 
account each extra member of the household has been presented at the Basque 
Parliament but has not yet been approved. 
24 Unfortunately, the scope of this indirect effect cannot be estimated. 
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My proposed Minimum Income Scheme design enables all three of these 
improvements to be made together. Issues such as requirements for 
receiving MIS and the design of employment stimulus are taken as 
given.  
Specifically, my proposal for a new design is the following:   
MIS = 	 (0.88) ∗ MW ∗ 1 + 0.5	 A − 1 + 0.3	C  
where A is the number of adults in the household and C the number of 
children under the age of 1425, 26. 
This MIS design not only uses an international poverty standard (the 
modified OECD scale) but also draws on the premise already set out in 
legislation of using a linkage with the minimum wage27. The legislation 
sets an amount of 88% of the minimum wage for a one- adult 
household. According to the EPDS, this is equivalent to 43.9% of the 
median, slightly above the figure for the extreme poverty line 28 . 
Furthermore, setting the threshold below the minimum wage does not 
discourage exit into employment. 
This scheme would raise the poverty threshold for 75.38% of 
beneficiaries and lower it for 10.55%. For the remaining 15.07%, living in 
type 1 households, it would remain the same. Notice that when the 
                                           
25 It should be noted that extra income received by retired people or single parent 
families under the BC legislation would be lost, since the modified OECD criterion does 
not consider that it entails any additional living cost.  
26 This paper does not assess “Supplementary Housing Benefit” (the periodic benefit 
provided under current legislation to cover the cost of renting habitual accommodation 
for those households that are owner-occupied): the proposed MIS design takes it as 
given and maintains it. 
27  Another possibility is to use the median individual disposable income of the 
population, but this number is not easy to learn. Furthermore, only past values of it 
could be known. However, the MW is not set by the Basque Government, so 
unexpected changes could affect the Basque budget. If this happens, some adjustment 
can be made using initial values of the MW and updating it depending on the funding 
available in the Basque Country. 
28 The figure for 2014 is similar: 88% of the MW is equivalent to 44.25% of the median 
income at that time. Therefore, this mechanism seems to be consistent over time. 
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poverty line is moved up new individuals start being classed as poor 
under the new threshold. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine 
how many of them meet the requirements for receiving MIS. To draw up 
a realistic simulation, new recipients of MIS arising from the raising of 
the poverty line should be estimated when the figures for the new 
scenario are calculated29.  
A comparison between my proposed MIS design and the current one 
offers the following figures30:    
Table 2.8. Characteristics of the recommended and current MIS 
 
 
The scenario simulated covers 129,369 individuals (4,876 more than the 
current one) and 55,193 households (4,783 fewer than in the current 
scenario). This is explained because all households whose pre-MIS 
income is above the poverty line cease to be recipients. The average 
number of individuals in the receiving households increases significantly 
because large households now have a higher poverty line than 
previously, so households with large number of individuals fall within 
the definition of “poor”. At the same time, 84,461 individuals (35,617 
households) are estimated as being poor but not meeting the 
requirements and therefore do not receive MIS. That is to say, MIS will 
never eradicate poverty as long as there are households that do not 
meet the requirements. However, for the extreme poverty line in the 
literature the incidence of the poor population in the scenario simulated 
is estimated in 2.56%, whereas in the current situation it is 4.88%. The 
                                           
29 For an explanation of how new recipients are estimated, see the Annex.  
30 All calculations are made assuming that only poor people receive transfers, in the 
amounts necessary to bring them up to the poverty line, i.e. 100% effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
Current Recommended
Individuals2covered 124,493 129,369
Households2covered2 59,976 55,193
Poverty2line2(%Me) [16.82G248.8] 43.9
Total2expenditure2(€M/month) 34.16 29.4
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total estimated expenditure on MIS in the scenario simulated is €29.40 
million per month31. This represents a monthly saving of €4.76 million 
compared to the current situation. The estimated expenditure for the 
MIS receiving households newly classed as poor in the simulation is €4 
million. 
2.7. Summary and Conclusions 
In the Basque Country (a region in northern Spain) a Minimum Income 
Scheme has been in place since 1989. It is a last resort scheme whose 
main objective is to guarantee individuals the basic right to a 
guaranteed decent minimum standard of living. According to the Basque 
Survey of Poverty and Social Inequalities in 2016 there were 124,493 
beneficiaries of this aid (5.8% of the population) in 59,976 households.  
The first aim of this paper is to measure the impact of MIS on poverty 
reduction. Three different poverty thresholds are used: two commonly 
found in the literature, known as the “poverty line” (60% of the median 
income) and the “extreme poverty line” (40% of the median income) and 
the one used in Basque legislation. The threshold set in the legislation is 
lower than the extreme poverty line for 63% of MIS recipients and is 
lower than the poverty line in all cases. Poverty is quantified using the 
FGT family of indexes, constructed as a function of the degree of 
poverty aversion. Specifically, they cover three dimensions of poverty: 
incidence, intensity, and inequality. Comparing the situation before and 
after the MIS transfer, it can be concluded that in terms of incidence MIS 
notably reduces the number of poor individuals and households. It also 
reduces the intensity of poverty substantially: after MIS Basque society 
is notably closer to eradicating poverty, i.e. the extra amount in euros 
required to put an end to poverty is much lower. In terms of inequality, 
the MIS is shown to be a very pro-poor policy, as it alleviates the 
                                           
31  The theoretical figure of €1.18 million corresponding to the stimulus to 
employment is not included in these calculations. 
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situation of the poorest individuals. Single-parent households are the 
poorest type, but their contribution to total poverty is low because their 
number is low and the amount of money that they receive exceeds the 
40% Me line in most cases. By contrast, households with three or more 
members and at least two adults are not so poor but they are much 
more numerous and they do not receive enough MIS, so their 
contribution to total extreme poverty is the highest.   
The second aim of the paper is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency 
of MIS. To that end, Beckerman’s Model is used. The question posed is 
whether MIS is properly assigned (according to the legislation) or 
whether same amount distributed in a different way would reduce 
poverty more. The findings reveal that in terms of effectiveness poverty 
under the Basque definition is close to being eradicated for MIS 
recipients. However, there is room for improvement in terms of 
efficiency. In fact, the amount of money spent is more than actually 
needed to eradicate poverty under the BC definition. In other words, 
with the same expenditure the BC poverty line could be brought closer 
to the standard extreme poverty line used in the literature.  
Finally, in light of the results, this paper presents an alternative design 
for MIS in the Basque Country. Firstly, I propose counting household 
members in line with an international standard of poverty. The MIS 
design proposed uses the OECD modified scale starting from 88% of the 
minimum wage (the current amount for a one-adult household). This 
threshold is more egalitarian as it is the same for all MIS recipients. 
Furthermore, it is equivalent to 44% of the median income, slightly 
above the extreme poverty line. The second improvement suggested is 
that MIS should not be paid to non-poor people, and that precisely the 
amount required to bring people up to the poverty line should be paid. 
These changes would enable the policy to reach full effectiveness and 
efficiency. The recommended MIS design covers 129,369 individuals 
(4,876 more than the current system) and 55,193 households (4,783 
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fewer). Furthermore, the amount of MIS paid would be higher for 75% of 
beneficiaries. It would not only provide wider coverage but also 
estimated monthly savings of €4.76 million. 
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3. Assessing the Impact of 
a Minimum Income Scheme 
in the Basque Country 
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3.1. Introduction  
Most European Union Member States currently provide some form of 
Minimum Income Scheme so as to ensure a minimum standard of living 
for households when they lack other sources of financial support. The 
emergence of these schemes dates back to 1992, when a European 
Council recommendation assessed the need to develop last resort 
schemes which recognized the basic right of every individual to ensure a 
decent minimum standard of living. These programs were part of 
comprehensive, consistent plans to combat social exclusion.  
Since then, implementation of Minimum Income Schemes (MIS) across 
European Countries has varied in coverage and effectiveness. The most 
widely used are the so-called "simple and comprehensive schemes", 
which basically cover every person/household in need of support, 
without confining their effects to particular categories of people. Since 
2008, The European Council has endorsed the objective of combining 
adequate income support with labor market activation measures so as 
to facilitate re-entry of recipients into employment. 
Although the implementation of these schemes is progressing in most 
European countries, albeit heterogeneously, there is no sufficient 
assessment of their impact on aspects such as poverty reduction, labor 
market participation of recipients and/or the impact of activation 
measures on their recipients in terms of re-entry. Examples of such 
studies include Gouveia and Rodrigues (1999) and Brunori, Chiuri and 
Peragine (2009), who assess the impact of particular MISs on poverty 
reduction in Portugal and in a southern Italian region, respectively. 
Additionally, Clavet, Duclos and Lacroix (2013) and Chemin and Wasmer 
(2012) assess the impact of two MISs - one potentially implemented in 
Quebec and the other in Alsace-Moselle, in France, on the labor market 
participation of their recipients. Surprisingly, we are not aware of any 
study that assesses the impact of labor market activation measures for 
MIS recipients on their re-entry into work.  
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Our paper seeks to fill this gap. Specifically, our study assesses the 
impact of a Minimum Income Scheme that operates in a northern Region 
of Spain - The Basque Country, called Renta de Garantía de Ingresos. 
This region pioneered the introduction of MIS in Spain in 1989. The 
Basque Country is currently the only Spanish region with a Simple and 
Comprehensive MIS Scheme. We assess first whether the Basque MIS 
delays entry into labor market for its recipients. Then we test the 
efficacy of policies aimed at enabling its recipients to re-enter 
employment. We do this by using the Inverse Probability Weighting 
methodology, which enables MIS recipients to be compared with a 
similar, fictitious group created by weighting non-recipients. By doing 
so, the treatment is dissociated from individual characteristics and 
hence pseudo-randomized. Our results indicate that, on average, the 
Basque MIS does not, per se, delay entry into work for its recipients. 
Interestingly, however, the impact differs from one demographic group 
to another. Furthermore, Active Labor Market Policies designed for MIS 
recipients, in particular training, have a strong positive impact on re-
entry into employment.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews 
institutional aspects of the MIS implemented in the Basque Country. 
Section 3 briefly describes related literature. Section 4 gives a 
description of the data and the main descriptives of MIS recipients. 
Section 5 presents the methodological and analytical assessment 
methods and the empirical findings. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes.  
3.2. The Minimum Income Scheme in the 
Basque Country  
The Basque MIS was introduced in 1989, with the so-called Integrated 
Plan to Combat Poverty.  In the last few decades it has undergone 
several modifications. In 1998 it was given the rank of law, the concepts 
of “poverty” and “exclusion” were defined and employment incentives, 
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penalties and infringements were established. The amounts provided 
and the requisites for recipients have also been modified several times. 
The latest modification was implemented in 2011 (Act 4/2011). We base 
the details of our description on that version.  
Eligibility Requisites: The first important point to note is that the Basque 
MIS is household-based. To apply for the aid, applicants must comply 
with the following eligibility requisites: first, they must show that their 
household income is insufficient to meet basic needs, which means 
inability to access the goods and services classed as necessary for 
minimum welfare in society according to the Basque Government 
criterion of poverty (which is outlined below). The second eligibility 
condition concerns residency in the Basque Country: in principle, the 
recipient of MIS in the household must be registered on the census and 
actually have resided in the Basque Country without interruption for the 
last three years. If applicants can prove five years of paid work in the 
Basque Country the residence requisite can be relaxed to one year 
instead of three. If none of the above requirements is met, applicants 
must have been registered for a continuous period of five years in the 
immediately preceding ten years. 
Furthermore, the MIS is considered as a last resort scheme, so 
applicants must already have applied for all other income aids to which 
they are entitled. In principle, the scheme is compatible with other 
income aids or wages of family members, so long as they do not exceed 
the defined poverty line. In addition, applicants must own no property 
other than their habitual residence.  
Coverage: MIS benefits are transferred to family units on a monthly 
basis. The amount set by the Basque Government to meet basic 
necessities varies depending on the minimum wage (MW), the number of 
people in the household, the number of retired persons and whether it 
is a single-parent household or not. Specifically, it is 88% of the MW for 
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single-member households and can reach 125% of the MW for 
households with three or more members. In the case of households with 
at least one pensioner those figures rise to 100% and 135% respectively. 
Single-parent households receive a supplementary subsidy. If there are 
other incomes in the household, the MIS covers the difference in that 
amount.  
Household Labor Market Availability: Both holders and other members 
cohabiting in the same household who are able to work must commit to 
being available to do so. In addition, they must participate in activities 
that increase their employability. In particular, the holder must sign an 
inclusion-oriented employment improvement agreement. However, 
although the spirit of the law is that every recipient should search 
actively for a job only around 40% are observed to receive any 
interventions from the public employment service or activating 
interventions. We do not know what criteria the Public Employment 
Service uses to follow MIS recipients to monitor their activation, i.e. 
whether individuals are self-selected into different activities or there is 
some kind of compulsory participation.  
3.3. Related Literature 
Very similar policies have been implemented in other countries, though 
few have been assessed. Furthermore, some pilot projects and ex-ante 
or ex-post assessments of similar measures to reduce poverty around 
the world can also be found.  
The Portuguese Guaranteed Minimum Income scheme (Rendimento 
Minimo Garantido), set up in 1996, follows a very similar structure to 
the Basque Renta de Garantía de Ingresos. However, the benchmark 
income for the benefit is very low, at approximately 50% of the absolute 
poverty line figure. Gouveia and Rodrigues (1999) provide a simulation 
of its effect on poverty using the Household Budget Survey for 1994-95. 
They find that 5% of households and 5.7% of individuals take part in the 
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program. The cost to the public purse is about 0.18% of Portugal’s GDP 
and 0.39% of total public expenditure, but the impact on recipients’ 
income is an average increase of 18.5% in the annual income of the 
participating households. According to this study, this policy measure 
has a modest effect on the reduction of the number of poor households, 
but a substantial effect on alleviating the intensity and severity of 
poverty. Following Beckerman’s model, which analyses the efficiency of 
income transfers, Rodrigues (2001) estimates the vertical efficiency of 
the program (as the proportion of total transfers received by households 
that were poor before the transfers) and its poverty reduction efficiency 
(as the proportion of total transfers that contributed to a reduction in 
poverty). The study concludes that the vertical efficiency of the program 
is 85% and the poverty reduction efficiency is 82%. This means that 
households that were initially above the poverty line receive 15% of the 
total MIS transfers, and 18% of total transfers did not contribute to 
reducing the poverty gap. A similar analysis has not yet been completed 
for the Basque Country, but it is currently in progress.   
A Reddite Minimo d’Insermento pilot scheme was implemented in the 
small town of Mola di Bari in the south of Italy.  Brunori, Chiuri and 
Peragine (2009) analyze such issues as (i) eligibility criteria; (ii) targeting 
choices and results; (iii) distribution and welfare effect on recipients and 
on the overall population in the town; and (iv) the incentive effects on 
labor market participation. Their most significant finding is that the 
mere use of a national measure of poverty tends to obscure individual 
situations, making it impossible to distinguish poor people in need of 
public support. By contrast, the second significant issue is that local 
administrations seem unable to correctly verify the income level of 
households. Their study also shows which categories of individuals are 
most likely to be activated. The analysis of the MIS shows that a 
substantial number of households improve their economic conditions 
thanks to the provision of public funds, even though the coverage rate 
is insufficient. Finally, they find no evidence to suggest that individuals 
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involved in the program tend also to become recipients in the following 
months. 
An ex-ante assessment of a Proposal in Québec is provided by Clavet, 
Duclos and Lacroix (2013). Every individual would be guaranteed an 
income equivalent to 80% of the Market Basket Measure. The study first 
estimates a structural labor supply model and then simulates the impact 
of the poverty reduction recommendation by the Quebec Committee. By 
predicting labour supply the result shows that the proposed scheme 
would have strong negative impacts on labor market participation rates, 
mostly among low-income workers. The so-called Revenue Minimum 
d’Insertion is assessed by Chemin and Wasmer (2012) in Alsace-Moselle 
in eastern France. Their estimates, based on double and triple 
differences, show that the RMI policy is associated with a 3% fall in 
employment (among unskilled workers aged 25-55), leading to an 
estimated loss of 328,000 jobs; with a decline in the job-access rate; 
and with a five-month increase in the average duration of 
unemployment. They also find considerably larger disincentive effects 
for single parents. 
 
3.4. The Dataset and Some Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1. The Dataset 
Our dataset consists of monthly longitudinal information on all 
individuals who were registered with the Basque Public Employment 
Service from February 2015 to January 2016. Data are collected on the 
last day of each month. Most of those registered are unemployed, but 
some may be employed and searching for another job. Their 
employment status is clearly stated. All MIS recipients and their 
cohabitants must register with the Basque Public Employment Service as 
a requisite for receiving income aid, independently of their employment 
status.  
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The database includes all the information provided by each individual 
when registering at the Employment Office, including standard 
demographic characteristics (gender, age, education level, nationality, 
postcode and residence, knowledge of other languages), as well as labor 
market information (previous employment experience, occupational and 
geographical searches, unemployment duration, etc.). The Basque Public 
Employment Service also provides exact information on whether 
individuals receive or have received unemployment benefits (entitled 
benefits, assistance benefits and/or MIS) and on the duration of 
entitlement. Finally, the database also records information on the 
assistance measures from the public employment services that 
unemployed workers have received in the last 12 years to enhance job 
access. Information such as the type of measure, number of hours and 
start and end dates are provided.  
Basque Public Employment Service in Spain divides the pool of 
unemployed workers on their files into "Registered Unemployed" and 
"Other Unemployed Workers". The latter category, which accounts for 
around 22% of all unemployed workers, includes retirees and 
pensioners, those not immediately available for work, those registered 
in the current month, those who just seek particular kinds of work such 
as outwork and teleworking and those who seek work for under 20 
hours a week. Students are also included in this category. We restrict 
our analysis to the “Registered Unemployed”, i.e. those without a job 
who are seeking work and immediately available for any "regular" job.   
The Basque Country has records of around 60.000 MIS recipients each 
month in the period under analysis, equivalent to 25% of those 
registered as unemployed in the Basque Country.   
In spite of the richness of information of the dataset, an important 
drawback is that there is no household identifier for MIS recipients. 
Hence, all we can assess is whether an individual is a MIS holder or not. 
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Hence, although the MIS is provided at the household level, the whole 
analysis is conducted at individual level for data restriction reasons. An 
additional caveat of the data is the lack of information related to 
household income, and in particular, to the specific amount of any type 
of benefits received by the unemployed.  
3.4.2. Statistical Distribution of MIS Recipients vs 
non-MIS Recipients 
To give a precise idea of the differences between MIS recipients and 
other workers registered as unemployed, we present the distribution of 
each of the two groups under a total of four characteristics: gender, age 
(<30, 30-44 and >44), education level (primary at most, secondary and 
higher education) and duration of unemployment (<3 months, 3-6 
months, 6-12 months, 12-24 and >24 months).  Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
show the distribution of MIS and non-MIS recipients, respectively, across 
the four characteristics. We do this for a particular month - October 
2015 – to get a better idea in not only relative but also absolute terms. 
Any other month from the sample would give almost identical patterns.  
Figure 3.1. Unemployed MIS recipients in the Basque Country
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Figure 3.2. Unemployed Non-MIS recipients in the Basque Country 
 
At first sight, the profile for education level and unemployment duration 
of MIS recipients is quite different from that of the rest of the 
unemployed. This is not surprising given that MIS is seen as a last resort 
scheme. In particular, 60% of MIS recipients have no secondary 
education qualifications and more than half have spent more than two 
years unemployed. The equivalent figures are barely one third and one 
fourth, respectively, for non-MIS recipients. More precisely, the biggest 
group among recipients is that of the very long-term unemployed aged 
over 30 with only primary education. This group accounts for a third of 
all MIS recipients. Among non-MIS recipients the equivalent group 
accounts for barely 10%. Furthermore, regardless of education level, MIS 
recipients over 30 who have spent more than two years looking for a job 
account for 50%. Focusing on the youngest group, it can be seen that 
more than half have spent more than two years seeking employment 
and 70% have only primary education. However, the pattern is very 
different among those who do not receive MIS: those who have been 
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unemployed for a very short time are generally young people with 
secondary or higher education. It is important to note that many young 
people with higher education continue studying if they do not find a job 
and are not therefore considered as unemployed. This behavior is not 
found among unemployed people with lower education levels, who are 
precisely the most common group among MIS recipients.  
3.4.3. Monthly Exit Rates from Unemployment to 
Employment (Job Finding Rates)  
We now describe the patterns of monthly job-finding rates for recipients 
and non-recipients of MIS, making use of the longitudinal nature of our 
dataset. We define “exit into employment” as a transition from 
“registered unemployed” in the current month to a labor status of 
“employed” in the next month. Therefore, the characteristics of the 
unemployed people are fixed in the current month. Following the same 
structure as above, we characterize job-finding rates by comparing 
recipients with non-recipients of MIS using the same four 
characteristics, i.e. gender, age, education level and unemployment 
duration. Given that we observe unemployed people from February 2015 
to December 2015 we compute job-finding rates from March 2015 to 
January 2016. 
On average, the monthly job-finding rate for MIS recipients is 3%. This is 
significantly lower than the rate for non-MIS recipients, which is 9%. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show job-finding rates for MIS and non-MIS 
recipients, respectively, for different profiles. It is immediately apparent 
that job-finding rates increase with education level and strongly 
decrease with unemployment duration for both groups. To give some 
numbers on the strong negative association between unemployment 
duration and job-finding rates, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show that 
individuals unemployed for less than three months have an average exit 
rate of 11%, while the very long-term unemployed (over two years) have 
a rate of only 1%. Interestingly, 60% of MIS recipients belong to the 
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group of very long-term unemployed. Another point to note is that 
although education level is relevant to understanding differences in 
access to jobs, it is far less significant than unemployment duration: the 
exit rate of MIS recipients with higher education averages 5%, compared 
to 2% among those with primary education only. 
Figure 3.3. Exit rates into the labor market of MIS recipients
 
Figure 3.4 focuses on the comparison between MIS recipients and non-
MIS recipients on job-finding rates. As mentioned above, there is a 
difference of 6 percentage points on average between the job-finding 
rates of the two groups. However, that difference varies markedly 
depending on individual profiles. For example, among the very short 
term unemployed there is a difference of 7.5 points, while among the 
very long term unemployed the difference is barely one percentage 
point.  
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Figure 3.4. Exit rates into the labor market of Non-MIS recipients	
		
3.4.4. Determinants of the probability of finding a job: 
MIS recipients vs non-recipients 
Finally, we estimate the probability of finding a job by the last day of 
each month for all those registered unemployed on the last day of the 
previous month. As above, we calculate the probability of finding a job 
from March 2015 to January 2016. The dependent variable, therefore, 
takes a value of 1 if the unemployed person gets a job in the next 
month, and 0 otherwise. 
To perform this exercise, we take into account all observable variables 
that may affect the employability of people registered with the Public 
Employment Service. In particular, we include demographic 
characteristics such as sex, age, nationality, disability, education and 
language skills; job characteristics such as requested occupations, 
experience, activity in the previous field of work, unemployment 
duration, geographical scope of the new job search, month(s) in which 
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the individual is observed as unemployed, whether individuals are MIS 
holders or not and province of registration.  
We add a dummy indicating whether individuals have ever been referred 
to social services. The receipt of benefits in the current or in previous 
months is also included. We include in our estimation an indicator for 
whether individuals have received activation services at least once in the 
last six months. 40.7% of MIS recipients have received some kind of 
measure in the last six months, as compared to 13.75% of non-
recipients. We divide activation service into the following categories: 
guidance, monitoring, information on self-employment and training.  
Table 3.1 presents the results of the estimation (marginal effects are 
shown) using a pooled probit model with month and province fixed 
effects. The first column estimates the probability of finding a job for 
MIS recipients and the second does likewise for non-recipients. Note 
that this estimation does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. It 
should be taken as a preliminary view of the importance of the 
characteristics of unemployed people in the job search process. 
The most noteworthy result has been already anticipated: 
unemployment duration is the variable that most affects the probability 
of exiting unemployment. The chances of entering employment 
decrease dramatically as the time for which a person remains 
unemployed increases. The largest decrease in the probability of getting 
a job occurs after the barrier of 3 months (reference group) with a 
reduction of 5 percentage points when individuals are unemployed for 
between 3 and 6 months. Being unemployed for between 6 months and 
1 year reduces the likelihood by one point (6.5 points less likely than for 
those unemployed for less than 3 months) and for those unemployed 
for between 1 and 2 years the probability falls by 1.6 points (8 points 
less likely). The negative impact increases to 9 points if the duration of 
unemployment goes beyond 4 years. A comparison of these results with 
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the impact of the same variable on the total number of unemployed 
people who do not receive MIS (column 2) shows that the duration of 
unemployment also has the greatest negative impact in this group. In 
particular, being unemployed for more than 3 months reduces the exit 
probability by almost 8 percentage points. As occurs with the MIS group, 
the likelihood of exit continues to decrease as the duration of 
unemployment increases, with exit being 15.7 points less likely among 
those unemployed for more than 4 years. As can be seen, no other 
variable has a similar impact. 
Considering levels of studies, in general the likelihood of finding a job 
can be seen to be correlated with the education level of each 
unemployed individual: having secondary education qualifications 
(compared with primary or no education) increases the probability 
midpoint; completing high school increases it by 0.8 points; medium 
level vocational training increases it by 1.2 points and higher level 
vocational training and higher university degrees raise it by 1.9. Notice 
that the impact of being unemployed for more than 3 months is double 
that of having university studies (as compared to primary or no 
education) for MIS recipients.   
A separate section below is dedicated exclusively to a counterfactual 
assessment of the impact of Activation Services on the probability of 
finding a job, so here we present only a preliminary assessment of 
activation interventions. It is important to note that information on self-
employment has a clearly differentiated nature, since people who use it 
are practically on their way towards self-employment. Thus, measuring 
its effectiveness via its impact on the probability of leaving for a job 
does not make much sense. From now on, we assess the effectiveness 
of only the other three interventions in exits into employment.  
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Table 3.1. Probability of finding a job. 
    
Dependent variable: exit 
probability 
    
Unemployed MIS 
recipients 
Unemployed 
Non-MIS 
recipients 
 
Women -0.0008 -0.0014** 
  
(0.00067) (.0006315) 
 
Foreign nationals 0.0002  -0.0106** 
  
(0.00076) (0.00107) 
 
Disabled persons -0.0074*** -0.0173*** 
  
(0.00197) (0.00243) 
 
MIS recipients 0.0013* - 
  
(0.0007) - 
 
Social services 
derivation -0.0227***  -0.0554*** 
    (0.00505) (0.01238) 
Benefits contributory 0.0104*** .0292*** 
 
 
(0.00151) ( 0.00089) 
 attendance 0.0091***   0.0245** 
 
 
(0.00080) (0.00112) 
 ex-contributory - 0.0406*** 
 
 
- (0.00090) 
 ex-attendance - 0.0207*** 
    - (0.00105) 
Activation 
services guidance 0.0056*** 0.0054*** 
 
 
(0.00056) (0.00082) 
 monitoring 0.0068*** 0.0048 
 
 
(0.00176) (0.00504) 
 self-employment 
info 0.0164*** 0.0237*** 
 
 
(0.00358) (0.00426) 
 training 0.0195*** 0.0403*** 
    (0.00126) (0.000148) 
Age 25-30 0.0018 0.0001 
  
(0.00151) (0.00152) 
 
30-35 0.0022 -0.0144*** 
  
(0.0015) (0.00154) 
 
35-40 0.0012 -0.0206*** 
  
(0.00144) (0.00153) 
 
40-45 0.0015 -0.0200*** 
  
(0.00146) (0.00154) 
 
45-50 -0.0006 -0.0208*** 
  
(0.00148) (0.00156) 
 
50-55 -0.0028* 0.0265* 
  
(0.00153) (0.00158) 
 
55-60 -0.0083*** -0.0473*** 
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(0.00159) (0.00159) 
 
60-65 -0.0178*** -0.0785*** 
  
(0.00166) (0.00159) 
Education primary 0.0026*** 0.0025* 
  
(0.00098) (0.00144) 
 
uncompleted 
secondary 0.0001 0.0041*** 
  
(0.00095) (0.00141) 
 
secondary 0.0053*** 0.0151 
  
(0.00102) (0.00140) 
 
high school 0.0080*** 0.0157*** 
  
(0.00135) (0.00155) 
 
Medium-level 
vocational training 0.0111*** 0.0289*** 
  
(0.00148) (0.00158) 
 
High-level 
vocational training 0.0175*** 0.0284*** 
  
(0.00177) (0.00158) 
 
Undergraduate  0.0253*** 0.0301*** 
  
(0.00317) (0.00187) 
 
Bachelor’s degree 
or higher 0.0176*** 0.0300*** 
    (0.00230) (0.00170) 
Unemployment 
duration 
3-6 months -0.0524*** -0.0796*** 
 
(0.00189) (0.00091) 
6-12 months -0.0662*** -0.1045*** 
 
(0.00172) (0.00087) 
1-2 years -0.0819*** -0.1297*** 
 
(0.00163) (0.00084) 
2-3 years -0.0857*** -0.1392*** 
 
(0.00164) (0.00091) 
3-4 years -0.0891*** -0.1480*** 
 
(0.00164) (0.00092) 
4 years or more -0.0943*** -0.1566*** 
 
(0.00160) (0.00081) 
  baseline prob. 0.0291 0.0617 
 
average pred. 
prob. 0.0304 0.0750 
  Observations 431,773 1,297,683 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additional variables are included in the estimation: experience in requested 
occupations, activity in previous field of work, language skills, geographical scope of 
job search, province of registration and months in which the individual is observed as 
unemployed.  
Baseline profile: men, native, no disabilities, not referred to social services, under 25, 
illiterate, unemployed for less than 3 months. 		
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3.5. Assessing the Impact of the Basque 
Minimum Income Scheme on the Labor Market: 
A Counterfactual Assessment 
 
Any Minimum Income Scheme is by nature a passive policy, as its main 
aim is to guarantee all individuals the resources required to meet their 
minimum needs. However, as mentioned above, the Basque MIS, 
following the dictates of the European Council since 2008, requires 
recipients to participate (in principle) in active policies to make their re-
entry into employment as fast and successful as possible. In view of this 
two-fold scope of the MIS, with both passive and active aspects, our 
assessment of the policy is also two-fold.  
Firstly, although the goal of any passive policy is not to accelerate the 
employability of the unemployed but to supplement their income so as 
to alleviate poverty, empirical evidence generally finds that most income 
transfers to the unemployed result in a delay in job-finding. Reservation 
wages increase for anyone who receives additional income, and this 
typically delays job entry, hence lowering job-finding rates. However, 
there are two aspects of the MIS which might accelerate rather than 
delay job access: one is that the MIS can also be received by employed 
workers with insufficient income to meet minimum needs, so MIS 
recipients might be willing to accept jobs with "low" wages compatible 
with retaining the transfer. The other is that recipients can lose their MIS 
if it is proved that they have rejected job offers. For these reasons, the 
typical "delay" effect of a passive transfer such as the MIS may be 
partially offset by some kind of “acceleration effect” for reasons other 
than the activation measures implemented.  
Our first assessment with respect to the impact of the MIS in the Basque 
Country looks at whether the MIS causes a delay or an acceleration 
effect, and if so on what scale. This is the first objective addressed in 
this section.  
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Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, we seek to assess whether 
active policies offered to MIS recipients make for better transitions 
towards employment. This is the second objective of the section.  
3.5.1. Empirical Assessment Strategy   
In both analyses the aim is to assess the impact either of the MIS itself 
or of the activation measures aimed at MIS recipients on the probability 
of exiting unemployment. As in previous estimations, the dependent 
variable (Y ) takes a value of 1 if the unemployed individual gets a job in 
the next month and 0 otherwise. The treatment (D), which is a dummy 
variable, takes a value of 1 firstly when the individual is an MIS recipient 
and secondly if the individual receives activation measures. The 
covariates included in our analyses are the same as in previous 
estimations (X).  
The main problem that we face in both the analyses carried out in this 
paper is sample selection. In the first one unemployed people need to 
comply with strict requirements to receive MIS. In the second analysis, 
the profile of the unemployed people who receive activation measures 
differs broadly from that of non-activation measures recipients (as 
shown below). Consequently, given that individuals are not randomly 
chosen, a mean difference between the outcomes of treated and control 
group cannot be used to learn the causality in the corresponding 
treatment. Only when participation in the treatment depends on 
observable characteristics (X) can the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATT) be estimated by conditioning on these variables, 
rendering the counterfactual outcome independent of the treatment 
(conditional independence assumption, CIA). However, the probability of 
finding a job for recipients and non-recipients of MIS might be affected 
by confounding factors. Therefore, it is hard to justify the validity of CIA 
in this analysis. In the second analysis, our lack of understanding of the 
selection process for receiving activation measures means that we are 
unable to argue as to whether CIA is satisfied or not. 
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Propensity Score methods are useful for estimating treatment effects 
using observational data since they enable observational studies to be 
designed along lines similar to randomized experiments (Rubin, 2001). 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that instead of conditioning on the 
covariates, conditioning on the probability of potential treatment 
conditional on observable covariates, the propensity score (p(x)=P 
(D=1/X)), suffices to achieve a balance between the treatment and 
control groups as long as other requirements are met. Firstly, the 
covariates influencing assignment and outcome should not predict the 
treatment participation deterministically (weak overlap, P (D=1/X)<1for 
all X). Secondly, the participation in the treatment of one individual must 
not have an impact on the outcome of other treated or control 
individuals. Our two samples confirm the weak overlap. Furthermore, it 
seems reasonable to think that being an MIS recipient or service 
recipient does not affect other people’s probabilities of finding a job. 
For these reasons, we believe the use of Propensity Score techniques to 
be appropriate.  
Different propensity score approaches have been suggested for 
estimating an adequate counterfactual outcome. The most widely used 
methods are matching and reweighting (Imbens, 2004). These methods 
seek to remove observed systematic differences between treated and 
control subjects. In our first analysis, Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) 
makes the distribution of observable covariates similar in the treated 
and control groups.  Furthermore, as explained below, IPW is the only 
valid methodology in our first analysis due to the characteristics of the 
treatment. For the second part of our research, our lack of knowledge of 
the selection mechanism and the characteristics of the sample assessed 
leads us to calculate the treatment effect using two different methods: 
Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM).  
The idea behind Inverse Probability Weighting is the following: random 
assignment guarantees that the distribution of the covariates among 
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units of observation in the treatment and control groups is 
probabilistically equivalent, i.e. all units are equally likely to be in the 
treatment or control groups. However, when the assignment is not 
random some individuals are more likely to be treated than others, 
depending on their particular characteristics. To account for these 
differences in the regression formulation observations must be weighted 
according to the inverse probability of receiving treatment. This gives a 
pseudo-random sample by weighting observations by the inverse of the 
probability of being treated. Therefore, the distribution of covariates 
between the groups would be probabilistically equivalent (Gardeazabal 
and Vega-Bayo, 2015). In short, weighting individuals by the inverse 
probability of treatment creates a synthetic sample where treatment 
assignment is independent of the observed covariates. Inverse 
Probability Weighting enables unbiased estimates of average treatment 
effects to be obtained. However, these estimates are only valid if there 
are no residual systematic differences in observed variables between the 
weighted treated and control groups (Austin and Stuart, 2015). We 
prove this to be the case here. It is thus assumed that when the 
observable differences are reduced, so are the unobservable factors. It 
stands to reason that a more efficient estimator can be obtained if the 
regression of the reweighted sample includes all measured covariates as 
additional regressors. This other estimator is known as Augmented 
Inverse Probability Weighting (AIPW).  
The IPW estimator uses a two-step approach to estimate treatment 
effects. The specification for the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATT) is as follows: 
1) Estimate the probability of being treated based on the covariates by a 
probit32 regression. Denote 𝑝#(𝑥) , i.e. the propensity score. Use the 
                                           
32 A logit model can be also used.  
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inverse probability weights to compute the new pseudo-random sample. 
Build regression weights (𝑤#) as:  
𝑤# = 1			𝑖𝑓		𝐷# = 1															
𝑤# = 𝑝#(𝑥)1 −	𝑝#(𝑥) 			𝑖𝑓		𝐷# = 0	
The idea behind this reweighting procedure is quite straightforward. The 
objective is to approximate the distribution of the covariates of the 
control group to those of the treated group. For that reason all treated 
individuals have weights of 1. Control individuals with a 0.5 probability 
of being MIS recipients are assigned a weight of 1; those with a 
probability higher than 0.5 have weights of more than 1 with an 
increasing pattern and those with a probability lower than 0.5 have 
weights of less than 1 with a decreasing pattern. By doing this, the 
outcome of those control individuals with the highest probabilities of 
being MIS recipients would gradually weigh more and the outcome of 
those control individuals with the lowest probability of being MIS 
recipients would weigh exponentially less. 
2) Calculate the ATT of the new sample, i.e. run a probit regression of 
the outcome on a constant and the treatment using the weights 
calculated. The coefficient of the binary treatment in the previous 
regression is a consistent estimation of ATT, provided that the 
propensity-score is correctly specified. Adding all confounders 
measured as additional covariates the Augmented Inverse Probability 
Weighting (AIPW) estimator is obtained. 
In the second assessment, an additional Propensity Score approach is 
applied: Propensity Score Matching (PSM) here helps us also to estimate 
the impact of activation measures. This methodology entails matched 
sets of treated and untreated subjects who share similar propensity 
scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985), and it enables the ATT to be 
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estimated (Imbens, 2004). The most common implementation is one-
to-one pair matching, in which pairs of treated and control individuals 
are formed in such a way that they have similar propensity scores.  Once 
a matched sample has been formed, the treatment effect can be 
estimated by directly comparing outcomes between matched treated 
and control individuals. Schafer and Kang (2008) suggest that treated 
and control subjects should be regarded as independent within matched 
samples. By contrast, Austin (2011) argues that the propensity score 
matched sample does not consist of independent observations. He 
maintains that in the presence of confounding factors covariates are 
related to outcomes, so matched subjects are more likely to have similar 
outcomes than randomly selected subjects.  
Based on Austin’s argument, we reject the use of the Propensity Score 
Matching in the first analysis. Non-observed factors such as family 
income differ systematically between the treated and control individuals 
as they are crucial determinants for being selected for the treatment. 
However, the second assessment uses PSM, as we find it reasonable to 
argue that the unobservable factors of treated and control individuals 
resemble each other more (given the selected control group used) than 
in the first analysis.   
3.5.2. Impact of MIS on job-finding rates - Does MIS 
reduce the probability of finding a job?  
As shown in previous sections, MIS recipients have a monthly job-
finding rate of 3%, compared to 9% for the non-MIS unemployed group. 
However, as already stated, the composition of the group of MIS 
recipients differs notably from that of the rest of the unemployed, and 
those differences (mainly longer unemployment duration and lower 
education level) may be causing at least part of the differences observed 
in job-finding rates. To isolate compositional differences from the 
income scheme, we use the Inverse Probability Weighting Methodology 
as detailed above. This enables us to assess the extent to which the 
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differences observed in job-finding rates are explained by (i) 
compositional differences between the two groups and (ii) by the MIS.    
To that end, we include in the treatment group all those individuals who 
are recipients of the MIS in the current month. Given that the 
observation unit is one individual per month, an individual may belong 
to the treatment group in some months (in which he/she receives the 
MIS) but not in others (in which he/she does not receive it). Hence, an 
individual may belong to the treated group in a given month and to the 
control group in another. To set up an adequate counterfactual, we 
must define the control group so that it provides the best possible 
simulation of job-finding rates for the group of MIS recipients if they 
had not received the benefit. According to the data, for 93% of MIS 
recipients MIS is the ONLY income aid received; a further 6% also receive 
other welfare benefits and the remaining 1% receive contributory 
benefits. In the last two situations, they receive both types of income aid 
because the other benefits received are still lower than what it is 
considered necessary to meet basic household necessities. We think that 
it makes sense to assume that if the income scheme did not exist the 
93% currently receiving only MIS would not be getting any additional 
income aid and the remaining 7% would receive an insufficient amount. 
For this reason, we have chosen to include unemployed individuals who 
do not receive ANY benefit in the current month in the control group. 
For this group, the observed monthly job-finding rate is 6.5%. 
Consequently, the outcome of the assessment must be interpreted as 
the differential impact of MIS on the job-finding rate compared to not 
receiving any benefit.  
However, the treatment (receiving MIS) is by no means random. As 
specified above, there are specific requirements. Some of them are 
observable in our dataset but others are non-observed confounder 
variables, such as total household income, that must be controlled for. 
To "correct" for these differences between the treatment and control 
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groups we use the Inverse Probability Weighting method. Table 3.2 
shows the distribution of the reweighted control group, which validates 
the use of the IPW methodology. This table shows that the differences in 
the main characteristics are eliminated by using the said weighting 
procedure.   
Table 3.2. Composition of the treated, non-weighted and weighted 
control groups in the analysis of the impact of MIS on the 
probability of finding a job (%) 
  Treatment 
Non- 
weighted 
Control 
Weighted 
control 
Gender       
Men 49.6 42.19 48.3 
Women 50.4 57.81 51.7 
Age 
   < 30 16.27 20.13 14.1 
30-44 45.73 39.32 50.5 
> 44 37.99 40.55 35.4 
Education       
Primary 59.82 32.7 61.3 
Secondary 26.83 29.72 26.3 
Tertiary 13.35 37.58 12.4 
Unemployment 
duration     
 < 3 months 12.29 33.73 11.5 
3-6 months 7.04 10.8 6.2 
6-12 months 11.03 11.98 11.3 
1-2 years 17.42 13.55 18.8 
> 2 years 52.21 29.94 52.1 
Treated group: Unemployed MIS recipients.  
Control group: Unemployed people without benefits.  
 
The results of the Inverse Probability Weighting Estimation and of an 
extended version of it (the Augmented Inverse Probability Weighting 
Estimator) are presented in Table 3.3. Applying such methodology, we 
find that the impact of MIS is not significantly different from zero at any 
significance level. The result is the same for both the IPW and the AIPW 
estimators, which makes it more reliable. This indicates that the 
monthly job-finding probability for MIS recipients would have been the 
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same if they had not received any benefit. We can thus conclude that the 
MIS itself does not reduce the probability of finding a job. In other 
words, the differences observed in job-finding rates between the 
treatment and the control group are due solely to the difference in the 
compositions of the two groups and not to the effect of the policy. 
Table 3.3. Assessment results: impact of MIS on the probability of 
finding a job. 
 
IPW AIPW 
ATT 0.000135 -0.000690 
 
(0.000823) (0.000510) 
Observations 724,141 724,141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
IPW: Inverse Probability Weighting. AIPW: Augmented Inverse Probability 
Weighting. 
Treated group: Unemployed MIS recipients.  
Control group: Unemployed people without benefits. 
 
As a second step, we analyze whether the MIS has different impacts on 
different demographic groups. Specifically, we assess the impact of MIS 
on men and women separately, on three age groups (< 30, 30-44 and > 
45) and on three education groups (primary, secondary and higher) . 
The results, presented in Table 3.4, confirm that the impact of MIS is not 
homogeneous across demographic groups. In particular, for women MIS 
delays exit to employment slightly (0.2 p.p.) whereas it has no impact 
on men. Second, the MIS accelerates job-finding for older workers (0.2 
p.p.) whereas for young workers (<30) it delays exit to employment (1 
p.p.). Finally, we find a delay as an impact of MIS for less educated 
workers (0.2 p.p.), whereas it accelerates job entry for those with more 
than primary education (0.2 p.p. for workers with secondary education 
and 0.5 p.p. for those with higher education).  
Our results coincide partially with the ex-ante assessment in Clavet, 
Duclos and Lacroix (2013) and with the findings (double and triple 
difference estimation strategy) in Chemin and Wasmer (2012). Both find 
a negative impact on labor market participation, particularly among 
specific groups such as low-skilled workers. However, their results are 
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not directly comparable to ours as the methodology and the design of 
the policies in the regions that they examine are different. To our 
knowledge there is no comparable assessment of a similar policy. 
Table 3.4. Assessment results: impact of MIS on the probability of 
finding a job per group. 
    IPW AIPW 
Gender 
Men                    
ATT 0.00308** 0.000745 
  
(0.00120) (0.000835) 
 
Obs. 324,751 324,751 
 
Women              
ATT -0.00165** 
-
0.00190*** 
  
(0.000681) (0.000506) 
 
Obs. 399,393 399,390 
Age 
< 30                     
ATT    -0.0128*** -0.0108*** 
  
(0.00124) (0.00109) 
 
Obs. 190,570 190,570 
 
30-44                  
ATT 0.00343*** 0.00127 
  
(0.00122) (0.000883) 
 
Obs. 272,115 272,115 
 
> 44                     
ATT 0.00228** 0.00223*** 
  
(0.00102) (0.000598) 
 
Obs. 261,456 261,456 
Education 
Primary               
ATT -0.00144* 
-
0.00202*** 
  
(0.000804) (0.000592) 
 
Obs. 371,111 371,111 
 
Secondary          
ATT 0.00368*** 0.00276*** 
  
(0.00119) (0.000895) 
 
Obs. 196,226 196,226 
 
Tertiary               
ATT 0.00641*** 0.00545*** 
  
(0.00180) (0.00129) 
  Obs. 156,807 156,807 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
IPW: Inverse Probability Weighting. AIPW: Augmented Inverse Probability 
Weighting 
Treated group: Unemployed MIS recipients belonging to the specific group.  
Control group: Unemployed people without benefits belonging to the specific 
group. 
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The main conclusion of this exercise is as follows: by definition, the MIS 
reduces poverty and promotes social cohesion. Our analysis leads us to 
conclude that on average the MIS per se does not delay exit to 
employment. However, we do find differences in its impact on different 
demographic groups. In particular, it causes an undesired delay effect 
(also commonly found in other passive policies) for women, the less 
educated and young people, but accelerates entry into employment for 
medium and high-educated workers and for those aged over 45.  
3.5.3. The Impact of Active Policies on job finding 
probability for MIS recipients 
In this section we assess the effectiveness of the activation interventions 
received by MIS recipients. Such an assessment is highly recommended 
given that in general active policies are quite costly. It enables us to 
check and if necessary modify and improve the efficiency of the Basque 
Public Employment Service in providing recipients with the tools that 
they need to re-enter employment. This information can certainly 
highlight what actions should be strengthened, modified or even 
eliminated. 
Recall that we focus on three types of Active Policy: guidance, 
monitoring and training. First of all, individuals are classed as users of 
activation services if they are observed to have received such measures 
at least once in the last six months (including the current month). 
Secondly, we present some descriptive statistics to show the extent of 
activation for the MIS group.  As in the descriptive section, we focus (in 
order to present the characteristics of the unemployed) on a particular 
month (October 2015) so as to avoid overrepresentation of the long-
term unemployed. Of the 38.345 unemployed people registered as MIS 
recipients in that month, 15.630 had received some kind of active policy 
in the form of guidance, monitoring or training at some time in the 
previous 6 months. This amounts to 40.8% of the total. As regards the 
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types of services received, 15,106 people (39,4% of all unemployed MIS 
recipients) received guidance services, 265 (0.7%) monitoring services 
and 881 (2.3%) training courses. This means that 728 individuals 
received more than one type of service. Given the low figure for 
monitoring, from here on we focus our results on activation through 
guidance or training interventions.  
A brief profile is given below of how individuals involved in each of 
these two policies compare to individuals who receive no activation 
measures. Table 3.5 shows the distribution of the four main 
characteristics (sex, age, education and unemployment duration) 
depending on the type of active policy received. 
In general men receive more activation than women: around 65% of 
those who received training were men. The age range varies depending 
on the type of service. Guidance and training predominate in the 30-45-
age range (their relative incidence among MIS receivers is 46%). In 
general, young people tend to receive fewer activation interventions. 
There are also substantial differences between education levels: 60% of 
MIS recipients have at most primary education, 27% secondary and 13% 
higher education, which means that on average fewer activation 
measures are received by highly educated MIS recipients. In addition, 
activation measures decrease as unemployment duration increases.  
Furthermore, we find distributional differences per type of activation 
measure. Guidance measures are distributed similarly across education 
levels, but we find significant differences in training measures, as 
recipients with secondary or higher education levels receive more 
training measures than those with at most primary education. 
To assess the impact of each of these activation interventions, we place 
those MIS recipients who have received each particular activation policy 
being assessed (either individual guidance or training) in the last six 
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months in the treatment group. As before, we measure the impact of 
receiving the activation measures on monthly job-finding rates. As a 
control group we use MIS recipients who have not participated in ANY 
activation measures from the Public Employment Service in the last six 
months so as to get a cleaner impact of each specific activation 
measure. The results must therefore be interpreted as the impact of the 
intervention on the probability of finding a job compared to not 
receiving any activation service in the last six months.  
Table 3.5. Composition of MIS recipients per type of activation (%) 
  No activation Guidance Training 
Gender       
Men 48.0 51.7 64.5 
Women 52.0 48.3 35.5 
Age 
   < 30 18.6 12.9 16.0 
30-44 43.1 49.4 54.3 
> 44 38.3 37.7 29.7 
Education       
Primary 60.8 59.1 41.1 
Secondary 26.6 27.0 36.4 
Tertiary 12.6 13.9 22.5 
Unemployment duration 
   < 3 months 13.2 10.7 18.2 
3-6 months 7.9 5.8 4.5 
6-12 months 11.3 10.6 11.0 
1-2 years 16.7 18.5 19.5 
> 2 years 50.9 54.4 46.8 	
As shown in Table 3.5, the treatment and control groups differ in 
important characteristics such as the duration of unemployment and 
education level. We assess each intervention following the IPW 
methodology described above. The interventions are thus "pseudo-
randomized", so the distribution of the covariates between the two 
groups is balanced and the treatment is probabilistically equivalent. 
Therefore, the impact of each type of intervention can be properly 
assessed without the results being biased by differences in composition.  
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In addition to the IPW (and AIPW) method, we also use a Propensity Score 
Matching technique to enhance robustness. Given that the control group 
now consists of MIS-recipients (although they do not receive activation 
measures), we find it reasonable to assume that unobserved 
confounding factors of treated and control individuals do not differ 
substantially from one group to the other. This assumption is essential 
to validate the use of the Propensity Score Matching technique.  
The results of the assessment of each active policy for MIS recipients 
(guidance and training) are shown in Table 3.6. Inverse Probability 
Weighting (IPW), Augmented Inverse Probability Weighting (AIPW) and 
the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimators are presented. The first 
three columns correspond to the three specifications for the impact of 
guidance service. It can be seen that guidance has a positive impact on 
exit into employment. This impact is statistically significant for all three 
approaches, although its magnitude differs slightly from one to the 
other. As a general result, we conclude that guidance increases the 
probability of getting a job by about half a percentage point over not 
receiving any activation intervention in the last six months.  
The last three columns in Table 3.6 show the impact of training 
programs on job-finding rates. Unfortunately, we have no information 
on the type of training provided or on whether there is any selection 
process prior to participating in a training program. Given this 
information limitation, all that we can assert is whether participating in 
any kind of training program helps individuals find a job.  What we find 
is that training is undoubtedly the factor with greatest impact on the 
probability of finding a job for the MIS group. Individuals who use these 
programs increase their likelihood of finding a job by around 3 
percentage points. Given that the average job-finding rate for MIS 
recipients is 3%, the probability of finding a job increases by around 
100% when an unemployed MIS recipient attends a training course. Due 
to their potential for job-finding, it would be most helpful to have more 
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detailed information regarding training programs so as to assess in the 
future more precisely which types of training program seem to work 
best.   
Table 3.6. Assessment results: impact of activation on the probability 
of finding a job. 
  Guidance Training 
  IPW AIPW PSM IPW AIPW PSM 
ATT 0.00543*** 0.00475*** 0.00760*** 0.0297*** 0.0258*** 0.0298*** 
 
(0.000601) (0.000453) (0.000772) (0.00233) (0.00204) (0.00292) 
N. Obs 431,773 431,773 420,482 431,773 431,773 292,816 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
IPW: Inverse Probability Weighting. AIPW: Augmented Inverse Probability 
Weighting. PSM: Propensity Score Matching 
Treated group: Unemployed MIS recipients who have received activation 
services in the last six months.  
Control group: Unemployed MIS recipients who have not received any 
activation services in the last six months 
 
In line with the literature on Active Labor Market Policies, we also find 
that an adequate design of activation policies accelerates re-entry into 
employment. In short, active policies significantly accelerate the 
probability of finding a job for MIS recipients. However, only around 40% 
of them use such measures, even though participation in them is 
supposedly compulsory. Specifically, training is the most effective 
policy: those who undergo it are twice as likely to find a job. This 
conclusion emphasizes the importance of linking passive policies with 
active policies, because those MIS recipients who use active policies 
enhance their chances of finding a job compared to similar unemployed 
people who do not receive any aid.   
3.6. Summary and Conclusions   
In the Basque Country (a region in north-eastern Spain) a Minimum 
Income Scheme has been in place continuously since 1989. Its main 
objective is to guarantee all individuals the resources required to cover 
their basic necessities, and at the same time to provide for their 
progressive integration into society and employment. Furthermore, in 
line with European Council recommendations, the Basque MIS has an 
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interesting feature:  recipients are in principle required to participate in 
active measures to make their re-entry into employment as fast and 
successful as possible.  
In 2015 there were about 62,000 MIS recipients, 60% of whom belonged 
to the group denoted as “registered-unemployed” at the Public 
Employment Service. The rest are workers, retired recipients and non-
working persons who for different reasons do not fit into the category of 
those registered as unemployed. MIS recipients account for 25% of all 
the registered unemployed in the Basque Country. 
Given that the Basque MIS is a last resort scheme, individuals with low 
education levels and the (very) long-term unemployed are prevalent 
among recipients. Specifically, 60% of MIS recipients have at most 
primary education and 52% have been looking for a job for more than 
two years. Unsurprisingly, low education levels and particularly long 
unemployment durations are the main determinants that delay job-
finding. Indeed, MIS recipients have an average monthly job-finding rate 
of 3%, while for unemployed people who do not receive the MIS, the rate 
stands at 9%.  
The first empirical strategy in this paper is to measure whether this 
difference is solely due to the different composition of the unemployed 
or, whether the MIS delays entry into employment as empirical evidence 
has proven that passive policies do in general.  
The second aim of the paper is to measure the effectiveness of active 
policies on MIS recipients in terms of their impact on the probability of 
finding a job. Even though all MIS recipients are supposed to engage in 
activation measures, the fact is that only around 40% of them (16,000 
out of 38,000 unemployed recipients) have done so at any time in the 
last six months. Guidance is the most common service: it is received by 
39% of all unemployed MIS recipients. It is followed at some distance by 
130 
 
training (received by only 2.3%). The profiles of the participants differ 
from one kind of activation measure to another and also with respect to 
those who do not participate in such services.  
Propensity Score methods are applied in both assessments. In both 
analyses we follow an Inverse Probability Weighting methodology. In the 
second exercise we also supplement our assessment with a Propensity 
Score Matching. Both methodologies help us deal with confounding 
effects and differences in composition between the treated and control 
groups in the most suitable way according to the characteristics of the 
corresponding sample. 
Our results confirm that on average the MIS does not delay entry into 
employment, so the difference in the job-finding rates observed are due 
solely to the different compositions of the treated and control groups. If 
the analysis is conducted for specific population groups, we find that its 
impact differs. The undesired delay effect commonly found in passive 
policies is observed among less educated and younger MIS recipients, 
but the MIS accelerates entry into employment for medium and high-
educated people and for the over 45s. To the best of our knowledge 
there are no other assessments of similar policy implementations that 
we could compare our results with.  
The second finding is that all types of public employment activation 
services have positive impacts on job-finding rates, but the extent of 
that impact varies from one measure to another: the most effective 
services are training programs (which double the probability of finding a 
new job), followed by guidance services (which increase the probability 
by around 20%). Hence, as a policy device, this study supports the 
conclusion that training services for MIS recipients should be enforced, 
as they help recipients to re-enter employment, which is the ultimate 
aim of activation measures. Moreover, it is essential to emphasize the 
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importance of linking passive policies with activation measures for 
recipients.  
Finally, for future research we have two related projects to work on, 
both of which require more information. The first is to extend our study 
to a duration type analysis, where the question to be answered is not 
based on instantaneous job finding rates but rather on time to exit from 
unemployment. For now we are limited by the fact that we only have 
information on all unemployed workers for 12 months. For MIS 
recipients, more than 70% of whom have been unemployed for more 
than a year, we would need longer longitudinal information. Secondly, 
we would like to obtain more precise information on what training 
programs MIS recipients receive, so as to learn more about what types 
of training program are most successful in terms of job-finding rates. 
This would enable us to be more precise with regard to policy advice. 
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4. Conclusions
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The main objective of this research is to assess public policies so as to 
better understand their impact on society and thus help to improve 
policy-decision making and make better use of public resources.  
Chapter 1 assesses the impact of a family-friendly policy implemented 
in Spain in 1999. It was aimed at granting parents the right to reduce 
their working hours with an equivalent wage reduction in order to 
enable parents to afford both to work and to take care of their children. 
Furthermore, users of the law enjoy greater protection against dismissal 
than other workers, to avoid layoffs caused by the use of the law. The 
study obtains several findings: First, the law has increased the 
probability of part-time working for eligible mothers by around 18%. 
Second, fathers are not observed to be using the working reduction. 
Third, based on these first two results, employers have behaved 
strategically in the sense of offering fewer indefinite contracts to 
potential users of the law, in this case women of fertile age. Finally, we 
test the view that eligible workers have used the law during the recent 
recession mainly to protect themselves against dismissal. The last result 
shows that the Great Recession reduced the likelihood of resorting to 
the law by more than 13%, which is not consistent with the aforesaid 
contention.  
From a policy point of view, it can be concluded that the implementation 
of a well-intentioned family-friendly policy, which in principle is 
available to both fathers and mothers, may have perverse effects if only 
a sub-group of workers -in this particular case mothers- makes use of 
it, given their traditionally greater role in childcare issues. The results 
obtained highlight the importance of assessing policies, as this is the 
only way to determine their causal effects on society. As shown, the 
impact of public policies is sometimes unexpected. This knowledge is 
essential in the design of future policies. 
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Chapter Two assesses the impact of a last resource scheme: The Basque 
Minimum Income Scheme. The first aim of this study is to measure the 
extent to which this policy has reduced poverty in the Basque Country, 
as that is its main objective. The second objective is to quantify the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme, which is essential with such 
a costly public policy. 
Although poverty is understood in terms of a certain minimum standard 
of living given the necessities of society at a point in time, there no 
single threshold that establishes who is poor or not. The literature 
commonly uses the 60% (poverty line) or the 40% (extreme poverty line) 
of the median equivalent income in the society. The Basque legislation 
uses a different threshold, which is lower than the extreme poverty line 
as per the standard in the literature for 2/3 of MIS recipients and lower 
than the poverty line in all cases.  
Using the FGT family of indexes the impact of the MIS on several 
dimensions of poverty (incidence, intensity, and inequality) and the 
poverty lines presented is measured. The results show that the scheme 
notably reduces poverty for all the indicators presented, especially for 
the extreme poverty line and the line established in the legislation. In 
addition, the MIS is a very pro-poor policy as it works well in helping 
those who are far below the poverty line. However, poverty will never be 
eradicated as long as there are households that do not meet the 
requirements for receiving MIS. 
Beckerman’s Model is used to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the policy. This analysis seeks to determine whether the MIS is properly 
assigned according to the legislation or whether the same amount 
distributed differently would reduce poverty by more. The results 
determine that in terms of effectiveness, i.e. the ability to achieve a 
desired end, the MIS is very close to eradicating poverty for its 
recipients. However, when “waste of resources” is taken into account, 
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i.e. in terms of efficiency, there is considerable room for improvement. 
Indeed, the amount of money spent is actually 12 million Euros higher 
than would be required to eradicate poverty.  
In light of the results of these analyses, Chapter 2 ends with a proposal 
for improvements and presents an alternative MIS design. The 
recommendation is in line with an international standard of poverty: It 
uses the OECD modified scale starting from 88% of the minimum wage 
(the current amount for a one-adult household). This threshold is more 
egalitarian than the current one as the equivalent income is the same for 
all MIS recipients, independently of the type of household where they 
live. Furthermore, it is also recommended that the exact amount needed 
to reach the poverty limit be paid out, so as to achieve full effectiveness 
and efficiency. The proposed MIS provides wider coverage and monthly 
savings of €4.76 million. 
Chapter 3 completes this PhD dissertation by assessing the impact of 
the said Basque MIS on the labor market. If MIS recipients stop actively 
looking for work, the presence of the policy could cause poverty to 
become chronic, so the beneficiaries would not reenter employment and 
would therefore never exit the scheme.  
Labor market literature finds that passive policies commonly cause an 
undesired delay in entry into employment. However, the Basque MIS 
requires all unemployed recipients who are able to work to be available 
to do so. In addition, they must participate in activities that increase 
their employability. The first aim of this chapter is to assess whether the 
MIS causes the mentioned delay effect. The second objective is to test 
whether the active policies directed at MIS recipients work.  
This study focuses on MIS recipients registered as unemployed. Given 
the characteristics of a last resource scheme, its recipients are mainly 
individuals with low education levels and tend to be very long-term 
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unemployed. Indeed, their job-finding rate is 3%, while the figure for 
non-recipients is 9%. The first empirical exercise consists of discerning 
whether this difference is due to differences in the composition of the 
unemployed or whether the MIS delays entry into the labor market. 
Using an Inverse Probability Weighting strategy that enables differences 
in composition between treated and control groups to be eliminated, the 
results confirm that on average the MIS does not delay entry into 
employment. However, the impact differs if the analysis is conducted by 
population sub-groups. The undesired delay effect prevails among less 
educated and younger recipients. By contrast the MIS accelerates entry 
into employment for medium and highly educated unemployed people 
and for the over 45s.  
The last analysis in Chapter 3 examines the impact of activation policies 
on MIS recipients. This analysis is conducted using the Inverse 
Probability Weighting methodology along with a Propensity Score 
Matching method, according to the characteristics of the sample. The 
results show that all types of intervention work in accelerating labor 
market entry. Specifically, training schemes are the most effective 
programs (doubling the probability of finding a job), followed by 
guidance services (which increase the probability by around 20%). 
However, although the spirit of the law is that every recipient should 
search actively for a job only around 40% are observed to receive any 
activating interventions from the public employment service.  
From a policy point of view, it is essential to emphasize the importance 
of linking passive policies with active policies, because those MIS 
recipients who use active policies enhance their chances of finding a job 
compared to similar unemployed people. Furthermore, the study 
supports the conclusion that training programs for MIS recipients should 
be reinforced.  
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For future research it would be important to conduct a duration analysis 
to determine time exits from employment instead of instantaneous 
finding rates. A deeper analysis of the types of job that the beneficiaries 
of the MIS get is also needed, so as to ensure a successful, decent entry 
into employment and subsequent emancipation from the MIS. This is 
not possible at the moment because of data limitations. More precise 
information on training programs for MIS recipients would be also 
valuable to reveal more about what types are more successful in job-
finding terms for MIS beneficiaries. As a more general recommendation, 
the usefulness of evaluating activation programs for all unemployed 
individuals should be highlighted, so as to facilitate their re-entry into 
employment.   
As a final conclusion, I would like to highlight the importance of 
assessing social and economic policies in society. This is not a 
widespread custom in Spain, but fortunately it is making headway, albeit 
very slowly. It is especially important in a situation such as the present 
one: a deep crisis that has left many long-term unemployed people, at 
risk of social exclusion or in situations of poverty. Effective policies are 
key to making the best use of public resources and, among other things, 
helping that part of society to re-enter more decent, equitable, 
egalitarian employment and thus reintegrate into a society with the 
same characteristics. Therefore, achieving an economic recovery in 
which the economic and social policies implemented are based on solid 
research outcomes is essential if successful results are to be achieved. 
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Annex  
Calculation	of	the	Total	Household	Income		
Household income includes own income, income from social security 
benefits, income from social assistance, and income from 
supplementary civil society assistance. The total income received 
includes the following items: monthly salaries or wages from salaried or 
similar employment, monthly income as a maintenance allowance, 
extraordinary payments for wages, salaries, unemployment benefits or 
pensions, income from the operation of a business of their own or from 
courses, conferences or similar activities, income from urban rentals, 
rural leases, annuities or income derived from pension funds or similar, 
income from real estate, prizes, tax rebates or labor indemnities. In the 
case of wages and salaries and of the proceeds of alimony, the different 
monthly incomes received by the different members of the household 
are aggregated. In the other cases, the income obtained by the 
household as a whole in the last 12 months for the items indicated is 
calculated and a monthly average is apportioned. Income from Social 
Security benefits includes the total monthly income received by 
individual household members from benefits or unemployment benefits, 
pensions or Social Security benefits (including non-contributory benefits 
and family benefits). Income from social assistance includes the 
following: monthly income from MIS, social emergency aid, scholarship 
income, aid to minors and other public welfare assistance. In the case of 
MIS the different monthly incomes received by the different household 
members are aggregated. In the other cases the income obtained by the 
household as a whole in the last 12 months for the items indicated is 
calculated and a monthly average is apportioned. Finally, income from 
supplementary civil society assistance includes the income of the 
household in the reference month from direct support from relatives, 
friends, neighbors or private welfare institutions. 
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Simulation	of	new	MIS	perceivers	
Theoretically, to receive MIS households must have an income below the 
poverty line and must meet further requirements. As mentioned, it is 
not possible to control here for who meets the requirements and who 
does not, so the simulation is conducted as follows:  
-For households where the BC poverty line is higher than or equal to the 
simulated line it is already known which meet the non-income 
requirements, because they are or are not already recipients. This is the 
case of households of types 1, 4 and 6. 
-For the other households, by type according to the legislation:  
1) The percentage of MIS recipients out of the total poor households is 
calculated, i.e. the weight of the households that meet the requirements 
as a proportion of the total  
2) This percentage is assumed to be constant with income. That is, 
when the poverty line is moved the weight of households that meet 
requirements other than income remains the same. 
3) For households whose income before the transfer is between the old 
and new poverty lines, some MIS beneficiaries are found (those who 
receive payments from area C), so it is known that they are eligible. 
Then, by type of household, I randomly add new households until the 
percentage of receiving households calculated in point 2 is reached. 
4) 100% efficiency is assumed, so all households whose pre-MIS income 
is above the new poverty line will not be recipients in the scenario 
simulated, even if they meet the other requirements. 
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